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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays studying different topics in macroe-
conomics under the common aim of assessing the role of nonlinear dynamics in
explaining selected facts of interest.
In Chapter 1, co-authored with Marzio Bassanin and Ester Faia, we explore the
linkages between financial crises and debt markets, where collateral constraints and
opacity of asset values are the norm. We, therefore, introduce ambiguity attitudes in
beliefs formation in a small open economy model where borrowers investing in risky
assets face occasionally binding collateral constraints. We estimate the ambiguity
attitudes process and derive that borrowers endogenously act optimistically in booms
and pessimistically in recessions. Analytically and numerically we show that our
ambiguity attitudes coupled with the collateral constraints crucially help explaining
asset price and debt cycle facts.
Chapter 2 studies the pass-through of sovereign risk in an environment where la-
tent confidence factors, along with fundamentals, might feed debt crises. A Markov-
switching VAR with three variables (private spread, sovereign spread, debt-to-GDP)
is estimated on fiscally-leveraged economies (Italy, Spain, Portugal). By allowing
fiscal and financial sources of amplification, the model historically identifies: i) an
high vulnerability regime, where sovereign spreads show excessive sensitiveness to
fiscal imbalances. Those periods line up mostly with the global financial turmoil
and the sovereign European debt crisis; ii) an high synchronization regime where
the sovereign and financial risk measures are strongly tied in a synchronized co-
movement. Those period identify more the first phases of the two crises.
Finally, Chapter 3, co-authored with Othman Bouabdallah and Pascal Jacquinot,
aims to extract an empirical narrative for France on the relationship between fiscal
policy and debt sustainability, in the context of fiscal regimes. We build a DSGE
model, where Markov-switching dynamics are introduced on the tax revenues re-
sponse to debt, expenditure and output gap. We then bring the model to the data
and show that two distinct fiscal regimes took place over the period 1955-2009: a
sustainable regime covered ‘Les Trente Glorieuses’ until 1977 and then re-emerged in
1999 with the euro membership; an unsustainable regime, instead, characterized the
1978-1998 period, where a policy mix of disinflation, external and internal balance
led to primary deficits and unstable debt-to-GDP accumulation.
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Chapter 1
Ambiguous Leverage Cycles
1.1 Introduction
Most financial crisis originate in debt markets and asset price as well as leverage cycles have
important effects on the real economy. Opacity and collateral constraints are the two most
notable features of debt markets and both can be a source of instability (See Holmstrom (2015)).
First, collateral constraints expose debt markets to the fluctuations in collateral values and the
anticipatory effects associated to their endogenous changes trigger large reversal in debt and
asset positions. Second, agents trading in debt markets hold doubts about the fundamental
value of the collateral. In this context ambiguity attitudes and endogenous beliefs formation
are crucial in determining the dynamic of asset values and debt, also since the latter is tied
to the first through the collateral constraint. The surge in asset prices and leverage observed
prior to most financial crises and their collapse observed following it have often been linked to a
combination of institutional factors, captured by collateral constraints, and endogenous beliefs
formation1. Optimism in booms, generated by assigning higher subjective beliefs to gains than
to losses, can explain the surge in asset demand, prices and, through the collateral channel, in
debt. Pessimism in recessions produces the opposite chain of events2. Despite the joint relevance
of those elements in explaining the unfolding of financial crises, as well as the dynamic of asset
prices and leverage over the business cycle, they are absent from the literature.
We fill this gap by assessing the role of ambiguity attitudes in a small open economy model
where borrowers, investing in risky assets, are subject to occasionally binding collateral con-
straints that tie the scarcity or availability of debt to asset valuations. The latter is then
affected by ambiguity attitudes, which render beliefs formation endogenous. Indeed the bor-
rower, endowed with a sequence of subjective beliefs upon which he holds different amount of
confidence, optimally chooses the degree of entropy, namely the distance between subjective
and objective probability distributions, subject to bounds on it. The confidence in subjective
beliefs are captured by an ambiguity parameter. Given the optimal entropy or likelihood ratio
(LR hereafter), which affects also the value of risky assets through the stochastic discount factor
1See also Barberis (2011).
2See Barberis (2011) for discussion on the role of over-confidence and under-confidence in particular for asset
prices and leverage also at around the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
2(SDF here-after), the borrower solves optimal portfolio and leverage decisions.
Importantly we depart from the standard ambiguity aversion framework3 and consider pref-
erences which combine ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking. We model a dynamic ex-
tension of the biseparable preferences axiomatized in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2001), which convexity the decision maker problem of
finding the optimal beliefs by nesting (depending on the weights) both aversion and seeking
behaviour. Extended ambiguity attitudes have also strong support in experimental studies4.
Specifically we model the decision marker problem using dynamic Lagrangian preferences a’ la
Hansen and Sargent (2001) and we then convexity them to nest both the entropy minimization
problem (ambiguity aversion) and maximization problem (ambiguity seeking). Consistently
with Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2001) the weight or the indicator function in the
optimal decision problem depends upon expected utilities. To validate our preferences em-
pirically we determine the mapping between the ambiguity attitudes and the expected utility
through structural estimation of the model. Specifically, we develop a novel estimation method
by adapting the non-linear method of moments to our model-based combined Euler equation, in
debt and risky asset5. We find that ambiguity aversion prevails when the value function is above
its expected value (a case which we often label the loss domain) and viceversa.Those attitudes
endogenously result in optimism or right-skewed beliefs in booms and pessimism in recessions6.
This structure of the beliefs coupled with the anticipatory effects, which are typically associated
with occasionally binding collateral constraints7, have important implications for asset price,
debt capacity and leverage dynamic. Consider a boom. Borrowers endogenously tend to act
optimistically and increase their demand of risky assets. This boosts asset prices and through
anticipatory effects also the demand of debt, which in turn endogenously relaxes the constraint.
This is also consistent with the fact that in booms the evaluation of optimistic agents drives the
debt capacity. The opposite is true in the loss domain. Ambiguity aversion typically induces
persistence, but little volatility. Our preferences which combine the two in a kinked fashion
induce the right amount of persistence and volatility needed to match asset price facts and debt
dynamic.
With the above model we obtain a series of analytical and numerical results related to asset
prices and debt dynamic. Analytically we discuss implications for asset prices and the Sharpe
3See pioneering work by Hansen and Sargent (2001), Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Maccheroni, Marinacci
and Rustichini (2006).
4Ambiguity seeking is strongly supported in experimental evidence. See Dimmock et al. (2015), Dimmock
et al. (2016), Baillon et al. (2017) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) among others.
5For this we use the procedure developed in Chen, Favilukis and Ludvigson (2013), where one step involves
the estimation of a latent unobservable variable given by the continuation value ratio.
6Our macro estimates are well in line with experimental evidence. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) provide founda-
tions for S-shaped preferences with changing ambiguity attitudes and show through experimental evidence that
pessimism (left-skewed beliefs) prevails in face of losses, while optimism prevails in face of gains. Further exper-
imental evidence by Boiney (1993) Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) has associated ambiguity seeking (aversion)
with right (left) skewed beliefs. On another front, survey evidence by Rozsypal and Schlafmann (2017), shows
that low-income households hold pessimistic beliefs about the future, while the opposite is true for high-income
households.
7Mendoza (2010) shows that the occasionally binding nature of the collateral constraints gives a role to
anticipatory effects. As agents expect the constraint to bind in the future, they off-loads risky assets and debt in
anticipation.
3ratio. For the first, we show that the conditional LR heightens asset price growth in booms
and depresses it in recessions. Second, the kink in the stochastic discount factor induced by
the shift from optimism to pessimism helps to move the model-based Sharpe ratio closer to the
Hansen and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bounds.
Next, we solve our model numerically by employing global non-linear methods with occa-
sionally binding constraints8. The policy functions and a simulated crisis event, which allow us
to discuss the economic intuition behind our model, show that optimism increases the build-up
of leverage in booms, while pessimism steepens the recessionary consequence of the crisis. In
both cases the comparison is done relatively to a model featuring solely collateral constraints,
but no deviations between subjective and objective beliefs. Ambiguity attitudes play a crucial
role in this result. In booms optimism boosts collateral values, hence, by relaxing the constraint,
it facilitates the build-up of leverage, asset demand and the asset price boom. In recessions pes-
simism materializes, which drives the transmission channel in the opposite direction. To subject
our model and belief formations process to further rounds of empirical validation, we calibrate
all parameters by minimizing the distance between some targeted model-based moments and
their empirical counterparts using data for the US economy over the sample 1980-2016, namely
the sample of both a rapid growth in leverage and then a sudden collapse in debt positions.
Under the optimized calibration, the model can match asset price volatilities and equity premia
(both the long run and the dynamic pattern), returns, Sharpe ratios, volatilities of debt and its
pro-cyclicality 9. The comparison with the model featuring solely the collateral constraint shows
that our model performs better in the data matching. To explain asset price facts borrowers’
ambiguity attitudes over the tails are crucial.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 compares the paper to the
literature. Section 1.3 describes the model and the ambiguity attitudes specification. Section
1.4 presents the estimation procedure and results. Section 1.5 investigates analytical results.
Section 1.6 discusses quantitative findings (the solution method is detailed in the appendix).
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Comparison with Past Literature
Following the 2007 financial crisis which was triggered by panics in various debt markets (for
structured products, for short-term bank funding and in repo markets, see Gorton and Metrick
(2012)) there has been a growing interest in understanding the determinants and the dynamics
of the leverage cycle and the role of the underlying externalities (pecuniary and demand) for the
real economy. Most recent literature tends to assess the dynamic of debt over the business cycle
through models with occasionally binding constraints. Papers on this topic include Geanakoplos
(2010), Lorenzoni (2008), Mendoza (2010), which among many others examine both positive and
8We employ policy function iterations based on a Tauchen and Hussey (1991) discretization of the state space
and by accommodating different regimes (portions of the state space) with binding or non-binding constraints.
9It is well documented by Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2016) at aggregate level and using historical data.
But it is also well document for consumer debt, see for instance Fieldhouse, Livshits and MacGee (2016) among
others.
4normative issues related to the leverage cycle. Papers focusing on the positive aspects show that
anticipatory effects produced by occasionally binding constraints are crucial in generating sharp
reversals in debt markets and in establishing the link between the tightening of the constraint
and the unfolding of financial crisis. None of the past papers however assesses the joint role of
financial frictions, in the form of collateral constraints, and belief formation, while both play a
crucial role in determining the asset price and leverage cycle in normal times and in explaining
endogenously the unfolding of crises even in face of small shocks. One exception is Boz and
Mendoza (2014) which introduces learning on asset valuation in a model with occasionally
binding collateral constraints. Contrary to them our beliefs are endogenously formed based on
ambiguity attitudes toward model mis-specification. Moreover none of the past papers conducts
a quantitative analysis aimed at assisting the quantitative relevance of those elements in jointly
matching asset price and debt facts and cyclical moments.
The relevance of ambiguity and of the beliefs formation process is crucial in debt markets in
which opacity is the norm (see Holmstrom (2015)). Indeed, contrary to equity markets in which
buyers of the asset wish to exert monitoring and control on the investment activity, participants
in debt markets usually trade under the ignorance of the fundamental value of collateral. For
this reason in debt markets a collateral guarantee is part of the contractible set-up. This indeed
serves the purpose of overcoming the pervasive asymmetric information. However even if the
information asymmetry underlying the specific debt relation is solved through the contracts,
doubts remain about the fundamental value of the asset, implying that optimism or pessimism of
subjective beliefs affect the agents’ saving and investment problem, hence the dynamic of asset
prices and leverage. Despite the realism and importance of the connection between ambiguity
and debt dynamic, this nexus has not been studied so far.
Since we choose to model endogenous beliefs formation through ambiguity attitudes our
model is also connected to the literature on ambiguity aversion (see Hansen and Sargent (2001),
Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006)). In this context
some papers also assess the role of ambiguity aversion for asset prices or for portfolio alloca-
tion. For instance Barillas, Hansen and Sargent (2007) show that ambiguity aversion is akin
to risk-sensitive preferences a’ la Tallarini (2000) and as such it helps the model’s Sharpe ra-
tio to get closer to the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)10. Epstein and Schneider (2008) also
analyse the properties of asset prices focusing on ambiguity-averse investors. More recently in
a production economy Bianchi, Ilut and Schneider (2017) have assessed the role of ambiguity
aversion for firms, debt policies and stock prices. We depart from this literature in two impor-
tant ways. First, we model ambiguity attitudes that encompass both ambiguity aversion and
ambiguity seeking behaviour. Ambiguity seeking is well documented in experimental evidence
(see Dimmock et al. (2015) and Dimmock et al. (2016), Baillon et al. (2017), Trautmann and
van de Kuilen (2015), and Roca, Hogarth and Maule (2006) among others). We introduce
the whole span of ambiguity attitudes through the extended multiplier preferences, which have
been founded theoretically by Baillon et al. (2017). We confirm the existence and significance
10On a different line of research Benigno and Nistico´ (2012) show how ambiguity averse preferences can be used
to explain the home bias in international portfolio allocations due to the need to hedge against long run risk.
5of ambiguity attitudes through time-series estimation or our model. Furthermore, it is only by
accounting jointly for ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking that our model is able to match
numerically the volatilities, the persistence and the cyclical behaviour of asset prices and debt.
We depart from this literature in two important ways. First, we model ambiguity attitudes
that encompass both ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking behaviour. Our preferences
are indeed a dynamic extension of the biseparable preferences axiomatized in a static context
by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2001). Both
papers show that ambiguity attitudes can be formalized within a general decision model by
constructing a biseparable preference, which can nest both ambiguity aversion and ambiguity
seeking. Effectively preferences are convexified with respect to the problem of finding the op-
timal beliefs, so that under a weight of one the decision maker solves a minimization problem
(ambiguity aversion) and viceversa. The weights in their formalization depend upon expected
utility mapping. In our work we construct a value function, which embed a multiplier on the
entropy, that can be convexified, thereby nesting ambiguity aversion (with a positive multiplier
on entropy) and ambiguity seeking (negative multiplier). Consistently with Ghirardato, Mac-
cheroni and Marinacci (2001), the indicator function, which non-linearly shifts the preferences
from ambiguity averse to its dual, depends upon the deviations of future value functions from
a reference level represented by the future expected value. Importantly our state contingent
multiplier are estimated as explained below. This not only validates empirically the preferences,
but it also allows us to pin down the exact form of the state contingency in the multiplier (neg-
ative in the gain domain and positive in the loss domain). Equipped with these preferences we
show that beliefs endogenously become pessimistic in the loss domain (when the value function
is below its expected value) and optimistic in the gain domain (the opposite case). This has
important consequences in our case. Indeed by embedding those preferences into a leverage
cycle and risky investment problem we can show that optimism induces price acceleration and
excessive leverage, while pessimism induces the opposite. Moreover the combination of am-
biguity aversion and seeking delivers the right amount of persistence and volatility needed to
explain jointly asset price and debt dynamic. At last the kinked nature of the preferences helps
in generating the right volatility in the Sharpe ratios, which governs risk-taking behaviour.
Note that ambiguity seeking as well as the state contingent nature of the ambiguity attitudes
also well documented in experimental studies (see Dimmock et al. (2015) and Dimmock et al.
(2016), Baillon et al. (2017), Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015), and Roca, Hogarth and
Maule (2006) among others). Multiplier preferences, embedding both gradation of ambiguity,
have also been examined by Baillon et al. (2017) through experimental evidence. We confirm the
existence and significance of ambiguity attitudes through time-series estimation or our model.
Furthermore, it is only by accounting jointly for ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking
that our model is able to match numerically the volatilities, the persistence and the cyclical
behaviour of asset prices and debt.
At last, our paper contributes to the literature on the estimation of SDF with behavioural
elements. The closer contribution to ours is Chen, Favilukis and Ludvigson (2013). A series
of papers have developed procedures for SDF estimation. We review most of them in the
6section describing our model estimation. An important aspect we contribute to this literature
is the development of an estimation procedure for a model which jointly accounts for collateral
constraints and for ambiguity attitudes. Our estimation uncovers the state-contingent nature
of ambiguity attitudes, namely optimistic in booms and pessimistic in recessions, while not
previously noted in the literature.
1.3 A Model of Ambiguous Leverage Cycle
Our baseline model economy is an otherwise standard framework with borrowers facing occa-
sionally binding collateral constraints. One of the novel ingredients stems form the interaction
between ambiguity attitudes and debt capacity. Debt supply is fully elastic with an exogenous
debt rate as normally employed in most recent literature on the leverage cycle.11 Collateral in
this economy is provided by the value of the risky asset funded through debt. To this frame-
work we add ambiguity attitudes, which includes both ambiguity aversion and seeking. The
latter is modelled through the extended multiplier preferences, for which Baillon et al. (2017)
and Abdellaoui et al. (2011) have provided experimental evidence and theoretical foundation.
The underlying logic is similar to the one pioneered and proposed by the game-theoretic ap-
proach a’ la Hansen and Sargent (2007) in which agents are assumed to have fears of model
mis-specification and play a two-stage game with a malevolent agent (nature) that amplifies
deviations from the true probability model and helps the borrower to explore the fragility of a
decision rule with respect to various perturbations of the objective shock distribution. Hansen
and Sargent (2007) focus on ambiguity averse attitudes. Under this case the game of interaction
between the agents and nature results in the latter inducing more pessimistic beliefs with the
goal of testing agents’ ability to make robust decisions. Agents therefore optimally attempt to
minimize the distortion induced by nature, by enforcing a positive penalty parameter under the
case of max-min preferences.
While ambiguity aversion has been the norm in macro and finance models, a crucial depar-
ture introduced by our framework is to consider the whole span of ambiguity attitudes, namely
ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking. Extensive experimental studies (reviewed above)
finds support for both. To include the whole span of ambiguity attitudes we employ the ex-
tended multiplier preferences discussed in Baillon et al. (2017) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011), as
explained above. Moreover through empirical analysis we uncover the state-contingent nature of
the ambiguity attitudes, whereby aversion prevails in recessions and ambiguity seeking prevails
in booms.
Importantly the contingent reason for considering this extended set-up for ambiguity atti-
tudes is that, as our analysis below shows through several steps, this is crucial for explaining
the facts we focus on, namely the patterns observed around the unfolding and development of
debt crises as well as the full array of asset price and debt statistics. At this stage it is also
useful to mention that within the structure of the zero-sum game the economic interpretation
11This model economy corresponds to a limiting case in which lenders are risk-neutral. Alternatively the model
can be interpreted as a small open economy with debt supplied from the rest of the world.
7of the ambiguity seeking attitudes is just similar to the one described above for the ambiguity
averse attitudes. This implies that under positive realizations of income nature induces opti-
mistic beliefs with the intent again of testing robustness of agents’ decisional process. Given this
interpretation, such beliefs formation process is also akin to the one considered in Brunnermeier
and Parker (2005) in which a small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to first-order gains
in anticipatory utility12.
Below, we show that ambiguity aversion results endogenously in left-skewed or pessimistic
beliefs, relatively to rational expectation, namely relatively to the case in which objective and
subjective beliefs coincide. On the other side ambiguity seeking results in right-skewed or
optimistic beliefs. Importantly the changing nature of the ambiguity attitudes contributes to
the occasionally binding nature of the collateral constraint. As agents become optimist their
demand for risky assets contributes to boost collateral values and to expand debt capacity. The
opposite is true with pessimism.
1.3.1 Beliefs Formation and Preferences
The source of uncertainty in the model is a shock to aggregate income yt, which is our exogenous
state and follows a finite-space stationary Markov process. We define the state space as St, the
realization of the state at time t as st and its history as s
t = {s0, s1, . . . , st} with associated
probability pi(st). The initial condition of the shock is known and defined with s−1.
Borrowers are endowed with the approximated model pi(st) over the history st but they also
consider alternative probability measures, indicated by p˜i(st), which deviate from pi(st).13 Bor-
rowers can have different degrees of trust in their own subjective beliefs, so that act as ambiguity
averse when they fear deviations from the approximated model and they act as ambiguity seeking
when they hold high confidence in their beliefs. Following the relevant literature, we introduce
the measurable function M(st) = p˜i(st)/pi(st), which we define as the likelihood ratio. We can
also define the conditional likelihood ratio as, m(st+1|st) = p˜i(st+1|st)/pi(st+1|st). For ease of
notation since now onward we use the following notation convention: Mt = M(s
t),Mt+1 =
M(st+1) and mt+1 = m(st+1|st), where the sub-index refers to the next period state. The
above definition of Mt allows us to represent the subjective expectation of a random variable
xt in terms of the approximating probability models:
E˜t[xt] = Et[Mtxt] (1.1)
where Et is the subjective expectation operator conditional to information at time t for the
probability pi(st), while E˜t is the expectation operator conditional to information at time t for
the probability p˜i(st). The function Mt follows a martingale process and as such it satisfies the
12Some connections between the economic interpretation of ambiguity seeking attitudes under loss domain can
also be traced with the news averse preferences introduced by Ko˜szegi and Rabin (2007) and examined more
recently in asset price context by Pagel (2014). In this case as well agents prefer not to receive news fearing the
bad ones.
13The alternative probability measure p˜i is absolutely continuous with respect pi. This means that events that
receive positive probability under the alternative model, also receive positive probability under the approximating
model
8following condition E[Mt+1] = Mt. We can decompose Mt as follows
mt+1 ≡ Mt+1
Mt
for Mt > 0 (1.2)
and mt+1 = 1 for Mt = 0. These incremental deviations satisfy condition Et[mt+1] = 1.
Moreover, the discrepancy between the approximated and the subjective models is measured
by the conditional entropy, defined as follows:
ε(mt+1) = Et {mt+1 logmt+1} (1.3)
where ε(mt+1) is a positive-valued, convex function of pi(s
t) and is uniquely minimized when
mt+1 = 1, which is the condition characterizing the case with no ambiguity attitudes. Given the
probabilistic specifications above, we now introduce the following kinked multiplier preferences:
V (ct) =

min
{mt+1,Mt}∞t=0
∑∞
t=0 E0
{
βtpitMtu(ct) + βθtε(mt+1)
}
if θt ≥ 0
max
{mt+1,Mt}∞t=0
∑∞
t=0 E0
{
βtpitMtu(ct) + βθtε(mt+1)
}
if θt < 0
(1.4)
where u(ct) =
c1−γt −1
1−γ . In the above expression, θt ∈ R is a process capturing the degree of
doubts about the prevailing model, which include ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seeking.
Later on we will characterize this process exactly based on estimated values. For now on it
suffices to know that θt is a state contingent binary variable which will take positive values for
states of the world for which the value function is below its average and negative in the opposite
states. Mathematically the value function under θ−t is essentially the dual representation of the
value function under θ+t .
The next session explains more in detail the axiomatic foundations of those preferences.
Our preferences can indeed be seen as a multiplier and dynamic extension of the biseparable
preferences Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2001).
Extended multiplier preferences similar to the ones in 4 are suggested also in the experimental
work by Baillon et al. (2017), albeit in a static context.
1.3.2 Preferences Formalization
The above preferences can also be derived as a dynamic extension of the biseparable preferences
axiomatized in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci
(2001). Both papers show that ambiguity attitudes can be formalized within a general decision
model by constructing a biseparable preference, which can nest both ambiguity aversion and
ambiguity seeking. Preferences are convexified with respect to the problem of finding the optimal
belief. Consider the instantaneous utility function, u(ct) and the problem of finding the optimal
belief. Given again the probabilistic specifications above we can represent preferences as follows:
9Iθt≥0 min{mt+1,Mt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
E0
{
βtpitMtu(ct) + βθtε(mt+1)
}
+
Iθt<0 max{mt+1,Mt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
E0
{
βtpitMtu(ct) + βθtε(mt+1)
}
(1.5)
As noted in Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2001) the indicator function shall de-
pend only upon expected utility mapping. We design the following expected utility mapping
so that θt > 0 whenever Vt ≥ EVt (which since now we often refer as the gain domain) and
viceversa (in the loss domain). We can therefore re-write our preferences as:
IVt≥EVt min{mt+1,Mt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
E0
{
βtpitMtu(ct) + βθtε(mt+1)
}
+
IVt<EVt max{mt+1,Mt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
E0
{
βtpitMtu(ct) + βθtε(mt+1)
}
(1.6)
Three theoretical notes are worth at this point. First, as noted in Ghirardato, Maccheroni
and Marinacci (2001) most decision theory models of ambiguity employ those biseparable pref-
erences, but add additional assumptions. For instance ambiguity aversion arises under the
assumption of ambiguity hedging, namely the fact that between two indifferent alternatives the
ambiguity averse decision marker prefers a convex combination of the two to each one in isola-
tion. Under ambiguity seeking this assumption should be reversed. Second, the dependence of
the indicator function upon the expected utility effectively creates a dependence with respect
to the state of the economy. Indeed it is only after a sequence of negative shock to wealth that
the value function passes its mean and viceversa14. Therefore, formally we should condition the
indicator function and the θt upon the state of the economy. With a slight abuse of notation
and for convenience we maintain our notation of a time dependent θt as in the context of our
model we deal with random shocks in a time series context. Second, note that the general for-
malization of the decision problem is not explicit about the exact dependence of the indicator
function upon the gain or the loss domain. This is effectively an empirical question. Indeed as
explained above it has been addressed in the context of experimental studies15. For this reason
later below we estimate our model and we assign to the Lagrange multiplier state contingent
process which is consistent with the data and the evidence that we find. This effectively also
serves as an indirect validation of the preferences. Note that for robustness we run two types
of estimation. The first is a reduced form through GMM confined to the model-implied Euler
equation, the second is a method of moments on the entire model. Both methods give the same
14In this respect the preferences are also akin to the news dependent preferences a’ la Ko˜szegi and Rabin
(2007). See also recently Pagel (2014). The main difference is that news dependence a’ la Ko˜szegi and Rabin
(2007) affects risk aversion, while in our case it affects attitudes toward uncertainty. Second, once again we
consider aversion but also its dual.
15See Baillon et al. (2017) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011).
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consistent answer, albeit understandably they deliver two different values for the estimated
parameters16.
Some additional considerations are worth on the interpretation of our preferences and on
their implication for the asset price and the leverage cycle. First, as we show below, when
solving the decision maker problem of finding the optimal beliefs, our biseparable or extended
(since now on we will use the terms interchangeably) multiplier preferences deliver pessimism (or
left-skewed) beliefs in loss domain and optimism (right-skewed) beliefs in gain domain. Framed
in the context of the Hansen and Sargent (2007) game with nature, the optimal belief problem
has the following interpretation. Under the loss domain nature tests the decision maker by
inducing him/her to assign more weights to adverse states, hence the pessimistic beliefs. In
a consumption-saving problem this naturally induces more precautionary saving, while in our
framework, where financial crises endogenously materialize, pessimistic beliefs are responsible
for stronger deleveraging (and fire sales) during the downturn. This effect is well in line with
post-crises dynamic. Under the gain domain nature again tests the limit of the decision maker
by inducing him/her to assign more weight to the upper tail17. This leads to the emergence
of risk-taking and excessive leverage. In both cases nature shifts decision makers’ behaviour
toward the tails. Hence, our preferences are well in line with the prevalent interpretation of
model ambiguity. As we show extensively below however considering ambiguity seeking and
extended attitudes helps greatly in explaining asset price facts as well as in the context of our
leverage model also debt dynamic.
Budget and Collateral Constraint
The rest of the model follows a standard leverage cycle model with risky assets that serve as
collateral (see e.g. Mendoza (2010)). The representative agent holds an infinitely lived asset
xt, which pays a stochastic dividend dt every period and is available in fixed unit supply. The
asset can be traded across borrowers at the price qt. In order to reduce the dimension of the
state space, we assume that the dividend is a fraction α of the income realization. Therefore,
we indicate with (1−α)yt the labor income and with dt = αyt the financial income. Agents can
borrow using one-period non-state-contingent bonds that pay an exogenous real interest rate
R. The budget constraint of the representative agents can be expressed as following:
ct + qtxt +
bt
R
= (1− α)yt + xt−1[qt + dt] + bt−1 (1.7)
where ct indicates consumption and bt the bond holdings. The agents’ ability to borrow is
restricted to a fraction φ of the value of asset holding:
− bt
R
≤ φqtxt (1.8)
16This is understandable since in one case the estimation uses information from only one part of the model,
while in the case it uses information from the entire model.
17Given this interpretation, such beliefs formation process is also akin to the one considered in Brunnermeier
and Parker (2005) in which a small optimistic bias in beliefs typically leads to first-order gains in anticipatory
utility.
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The collateral constraint depends on the current period price of the asset in order to reproduce
fire-sales driven amplification dynamics, which for this simple model would not be produced
with a different formulation of the constraint.18
1.3.3 Recursive Formulation
Following Hansen and Sargent (2007), we rely on the recursive formulation of the problem,
which allows us to re-write everything only in terms of mt+1. The recursive formulation shall of
course be adapted to capture the changing nature of the ambiguity attitudes.
We now partition the state space St in the two blocks, given by the endogenous and the
exogenous states, St = {Bt, yt}, where Bt is the aggregate bond holdings and yt the income
realization. Note that the aggregate asset holdings is not a state variable because it is in fixed
supply. Moreover, the problem is also characterized by the two individual state variables (bt, xt).
For the recursive formulation we employ a prime and sub-index to indicate variables at time
t+ 1 and no index for variables at time t. The borrowers’ recursive optimization problem reads
as follows. Conditional on θt > 0, the recursive two-stage optimization reads as follows:
V (b, x, S) = max
c,x′,b′
min
m′
{
u(c) + βES
[
m′V (b′, x′, S) + θm′ logm′
]
(1.9)
+ λ
[
y + q(S)(x+ αy) + b− q(S)x′ − c− b
′
R
]
+ µ
[
φq(S)x′ +
b′
R
]
+ βθψ
[
1− ESm′
]}
Conditional on θt < 0, the recursive two-stage optimization reads as follows:
V (b, x, S) = max
c,x′,b′
max
m′
{
u(c) + βES
[
m′V (b′, x′, S)− θm′ logm′] (1.10)
+ λ
[
y + q(S)(x+ αy) + b− q(S)x′ − c− b
′
R
]
+ µ
[
φq(S)x′ +
b′
R
]
+ βθψ
[
1− ESm′
]}
where the aggregate states follow the law of motion S′ = Γ(S). In the above problem λ and
µ are the multipliers associated to the budget and collateral constraints respectively, while the
term βθψ is the multiplier attached to the constraint ES [m′] = 1.
The above optimization problems are solved sequentially. First an inner optimization and
then an outer optimization problem are derived sequentially. In the first stage agents choose
the optimal incremental probability distortion for given saving and portfolio choices. In the
second stage, for given optimal likelihood ratio, they solve the consumption/saving problem
and choose the optimal amount of leverage. Intuitively, the problem is modelled as a game of
strategic interactions between the maximizing agents, who face Knightian uncertainty19, and
18Moreover, Bianchi and Mendoza (2015) provide a micro-founded derivation of this constraint, based on a
limited enforcement problem.
19Knight (1921) advanced the distinction between risk, namely the known probability of tail events, and
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a malevolent agent that draws the distribution (see Hansen and Sargent (2007) who proposed
this reading).
The Inner Minimization Problem
Through the inner optimization problem the borrowers choose the optimal entropy or condi-
tional likelihood ratio, namely the optimal deviation between his own subjective beliefs and
the objective probability distribution. The first order condition with respect to m′, which is
functionally equivalent under the two cases, is given by:
V (b′, x′, S′) + θ(logm′ + 1)− θψ = 0 (1.11)
Rearranging terms, we obtain:
1 + logm′ = −V (b
′, x′, S′)
θ
+ ψ
m′ = exp
{−V (b′, x′, S′)
θ
}
exp{ψ − 1} (1.12)
Finally, imposing the constraint over probability deviation m′, and defining σ = −1θ we derive
the optimality condition for the conditional likelihood ratio:
m′ =
exp {σV (b′, x′, S′)}
E [exp {σV (b′, x′, S′)}] (1.13)
Equation (1.13) also defines the state-contingent incremental probability deviation from the
rational expectation case. The magnitude and the direction of this deviation depends on the
agents’ value function and the value for the inverse of σ. We will return on the role of the
optimal conditional likelihood ratio later on.
The Outer Maximization Problem
For given optimal LR m
′
the borrower solves an outer optimization problem in consumption,
risky assets and debt. Upon substituting the optimal LR into the value function, the maximiza-
tion problem reduces to find the optimal allocations of consumption, bond holding and asset
holdings. The resulting recursive problem is:
V (b, x, S) = max
c,x′,b′
{
u(c) +
β
σ
log
[
ES exp
{
σV (b′, x′, S′)
}]
(1.14)
+ λ
[
y + q(S)((x+ d) + b− q(S)x′ − c− b
′
R
]
+ µ
[
φq(S)x+
b′
R
]}
uncertainty, namely the case in which such probabilities are not known. Ambiguity usually refers to cases of
uncertainty where the state space is well defined, but objective probabilities are not available.
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We will now derive and list all the competitive equilibrium conditions. Since now we return to
the notation with t and t + 1 indices as this is needed for our analytical derivations in section
1.5. The borrowers’ first order condition with respect to bond holding and risky assets reads as
follows:
uc(ct) = βREt {mt+1uc(ct+1)}+ µt (1.15)
qt = β
Et {mt+1uc(ct+1)[qt+1 + αyt+1]}
uc(ct)− φµt (1.16)
where uc indicates the derivative of the utility function with respect to consumption. Equation
(1.15) is the Euler equation for bonds and displays the typical feature of models with occasionally
binding collateral constraint. In particular, when the constraint binds there is a wedge between
the current marginal utility of consumption and the expected future marginal utility, given
by the shadow value of relaxing the collateral constraint. Equation (1.16) is the asset price
condition.
Note that ambiguity attitudes, hence beliefs, affect asset prices since mt+1 enters the opti-
mality conditions for risky assets, equation (1.16), and they affect the tightness of the debt limit
as mt+1 enters the Euler equation 1.15. In other words the optimal mt+1 affects the stochastic
discount factor and through this it affects the pricing of all assets in the economy. The model
characterization is completed with the complementarity slackness condition associated to the
collateral constraint:
µt
[
bt+1
R
+ φqt
]
= 0 (1.17)
and with the goods and stock markets clearing conditions:
ct +
bt+1
R
= yt + bt (1.18)
xt = 1 (1.19)
Definition 1.3.1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
is given by a value function Vt, allocations (ct; bt+1), probability distortions mt+1 and prices qt
such that:
- given prices and allocations the probability distortions solve the inner minimization prob-
lem;
- given prices and probability distortions, the allocation and the value function solve the
outer maximization problem;
- the allocations are feasible, satisfying (1.18) and (1.19);
- the aggregate states’ low of motion is consistent with agents’ optimization;
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1.3.4 Pessimism and Optimism
To determine under which states the Lagrange multiplier, θt, turns positive or negative we
will estimate our model implied Euler equations through GMM in the next section. In the
meantime it is useful to discuss how the ambiguity averse or ambiguity seeking attitudes affect
the endogenous formation of beliefs, as captured by the optimal likelihood ratio. For simplicity
of exposition we report the optimal condition for variable mt+1:
mt+1 =
exp {σtV (bt+1, xt+1, St+1)}
Et [exp {σtV (bt+1, xt+1, St+1)}] (1.20)
The conditional deviation affects how agents assign different subjective probabilities (with re-
spect to the objective ones) to future events, which can be characterized by high and low utility.
In particular, if mt+1 > 1 agents assign an higher subjective probability, while if mt+1 < 1 the
opposite holds. Given this, the sign of the parameter σt affects how these conditions are linked
to positive or negative future state realizations.20 The following lemma summarizes this con-
sideration and defines optimism and pessimism in the agents’ attitude.
Lemma 1.3.2. When θt < 0 mt+1 > 1 in good states and mt+1 < 1 in bad states. Hence,
beliefs endogenously emerge as right-skewed and agents act with optimism. When θt > 0 the
opposite is true.
Proof. First we define good states as those in which the current state value function is
above its expected value. When θt < 0; then σt > 0 in good states exp {σtV (bt+1, xt+1, St+1)} >
Et [exp {σtV (bt+1, xt+1, St+1)}] namely the risk-adjusted value function for the good states is
larger than the average one. Based on the above equation, this implies that mt+1 > 1. The
opposite is true in bad states. When θt > 0 then σt < 0 this implies that in good states
exp {σtV (bt+1, xt+1, St+1)} < Et [exp {σtV (bt+1, xt+1, St+1)}], namely the risk-adjusted value
function for the good states is lower than the average one and mt+1 < 1. The opposite is true
in bad states.
Beliefs Formation: A binomial state space example
To gain some intuition we discuss a particular case with only two income states, which we define
as high, with a sup-index h, and low, with a sup-index l. We also consider only two periods
which we label as t = 0, 1. By assumption the high state is high enough that the collateral
constraint is slack, while the opposite is true for the low state. This facilitates the computation
of the expectation operators. The states have a binomial probability structure such that state
h realizes with probability pi, while the state l with its complement 1− pi. Equipped with these
assumptions we can characterize the dynamic between time 0 and time 1. In this case the
20Concerning the size of the distortion, we can say that a large absolute value of θ increases the probability
distortion in all future states, meaning that m′ is close to unity. At the contrary, a small absolute value of θ,
implies that the decisions are far from the rational expectation setting.
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likelihood ratio can be specified as follows:
m1 =
exp {σ0V1}
pi exp
{
σ0V h1
}
+ (1− pi) exp{σ0V l1} (1.21)
where V h1 > E0 {V1} and V l1 < E0 {V1}. Note that depending on the time zero realization of
the state we have two different values of the inverse of the penalty parameter, σ0. To fix ideas
imagine that the income realization at time zero is the low state, l. Given our Lemma 1.3.2
we have that σlo < 0. The latter implies that exp{σl0V h1 } < E0
{
exp
{
σl0V1
}}
and exp{σl0V l1} >
E0
{
exp
{
σl0V1
}}
. Therefore, the marginal likelihood ratio are mh1 < 1 and m
l
1 > 1. As a
consequence, we can define the following subjective probabilities as:
ωh = pimh1 < pi ω
l = (1− pi)ml1 > (1− pi) (1.22)
As we can see, agents assign a higher (lower) subjective probability - with respect to the
objective probability - to the future negative (positive) events, typical of a pessimistic attitude.
The opposite is true when σlo < 0. In this case exp{σh0V h1 } > E0
{
exp
{
σh0V1
}}
and exp{σh0V l1} <
E0
{
exp{σh0V1}
}
producing mh1 > 1 and m
l
1 < 1.
Therefore, agents assign higher (lower) subjective probability to the future positive (nega-
tive) events, showing an optimism attitude:
ωh = pimh1 > pi ω
l = (1− pi)ml1 < (1− pi) (1.23)
The interesting feature of this state-contingent behaviour concerns its connections with asset
prices, the value of collateral and leverage. Further below we explain this in more details through
analytical derivations and quantitative analysis. Intuitively, optimism explains why asset price
booms and leverage build-ups are steeper in booms and relatively to the model with no beliefs
formation. To fix ideas consider the case with a negative θ0 and that the borrower experiences
a good state today and expects a good state tomorrow. Asset price would grow even in the
case with no ambiguity attitudes, however under our extended multiplier preferences, borrowers
form today subjective beliefs that induce an LR of mh1 > 1. As this makes the borrowers’ SDF
right-skewed distributed, it induces higher demand for both. This is why we label this case as
optimism.
Consider now the opposite case, namely θ0 lower than zero. According to Lemma 1.3.2 now
the optimal LR is left skewed, namely lower than one if associated to future good states and
larger than one to bad states. In other words the borrower becomes pessimistic. In this case,
if a bad state is expected asset prices will fall according to equation 1.16 and they would do
so more sharply than under when m1 = 1 across all states of nature. Hence we shall conclude
that pessimism explains why asset price bursts and de-leverages are sharper in recessions and
relatively to the case with no ambiguity attitudes. Appendix A.6 considers a more extended
version of the three periods model and also shows analytically that our ambiguity attitudes
interacting with the collateral constraint induces higher debt levels in booms. Further below
we explain through analytical derivations of the full dynamic model and through simulations of
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it how the ambiguity attitudes contribute to explain asset price and debt dynamics.
1.4 Estimation of the Model Implied SDF
To provide empirical ground to ambiguity attitudes within the context of our model and to
uncover how the value of θt changes according to the prevailing state we estimate the model
implied Euler equations. Once equipped with the process for θt we will solve the model analyti-
cally to uncover the main economic channels at work and numerically to assess the quantitative
relevance.
We devise a novel estimation method apt to a model with collateral constraints and extended
multiplier preferences. The method is based on adapting the minimum distance estimation con-
ditional on latent variables to our modelling environment. In a nutshell we derive a moment
condition by using the combined non-linear expression for the Euler equations (1.15) and (1.16).
As we show in Appendix A.1, the latter depends on the value function. We therefore follow
the approach in Chen, Favilukis and Ludvigson (2013), who condition the Euler moment con-
dition to the estimation of the value function. A crucial difference between our method and
theirs is that their value function has an unknown functional form, which is estimated semi-
nonparametrically, while ours can be derived analytically.
More specifically, the estimation procedure (whose detailed derivations are contained in
Appendix A.1) can be described as follows. First, one shall re-write the value function in terms
of an ambiguity factor. For this, we adapt the steps used in the recursive preference literature
to the case of our extended multiplier preferences (see Appendix A.1.1). Next, the implied
SDF is derived (see Appendix A.1.2) and the value function is estimated (see Appendix A.1.3).
Next, substituting the derived SDF into the combined Euler equations for debt and risky assets,
(1.15) and (1.16), delivers the final moment condition (see Appendix A.1.4). Finally, as it is
common for GMM estimation, we condition on a set of instruments, zt. The resulting moment
condition reads as follows:
Et


β
(
ct
ct+1
)(1−σt) exp
(
Vt+1
t+1
)
β
√
exp
(
Vt
ct
)

σt
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λt,t+1
(
Rst+1 − φRt+1
)
+ φ− 1

zt

= 0 (1.24)
where Rst+1 =
qt+1+dt+1
qt
is the cum-dividend return on risky asset and Rt+1 is the risk-free
interest rate, which is time-varying in the data. Note that the expression for the SDF can
be decomposed into two factors, Λ1t,t+1 = β
(
ct
ct+1
)
and Λ2t,t+1 =
(
exp
(
Vt+1
ct+1
)
/ β
√
exp
(
Vt
ct
))σt
,
where the second captures the role of ambiguity attitudes. Equation (1.24) is estimated fully
non-linearly with GMM methods.21 Note that tight restrictions are placed on asset returns and
21Optimal GMM parameters minimize a quadratic loss function over the weighted distance between population
and sample moments, by a two-step GMM.
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consumption data since our moment condition embodies both financial and ambiguity attitudes.
For the estimation we fix the loan to value ratio at φ = 0.6 and, given that θt = − 1σt , we estimate
the preference parameters, β and θt.
Regarding the data, we use real per capita expenditures on non-durables and services as
a measure of aggregate consumption. For R we use the three-month T-bill rate, while Rs
is proxied through the Standard & Poor 500 equity return.22 The choice of the instruments
follows the literature on time-series estimation of the Euler equations.23 They are grouped into
internal variables, namely consumption and interest rates two quarters lagged, and external
variables, namely the excess market return, consumption growth, the value and size spreads,
the long-short yield spread and the dividend-price ratio (see also Yogo (2006)). A constant is
additionally included in order to restrict model errors to have zero mean. Finally, the model’s
over-identifying restrictions are tested through the J-test (test of over-identifying restrictions,
Hansen (1982)). 24
Table 1.1: Estimation Results
Sample Estimated parameters
β θ θ(v˜t ≥ Ev˜t) θ(v˜t < Ev˜t) J − test
1980-2016 0.836 -4.278 4.000 7.014
(.016) (.053) (.068) (.857)
1985:Q1-2007:Q2 0.814 -4.261 4.51
(.014) (.039) (.985)
2007:Q3-2016:Q4 0.852 5.499 7.318
(.015) (.019) (.885)
Table 1.1 presents the results. The estimated values of θt are conditioned to the logarithm
of the continuation value ratio, defined as v˜t = log
(
Vt
ct
)
. Consistently we previous definition
good states are those for which the latent value function is higher than its mean and vice-versa
for bad states. Column 3 shows results conditioned upon the relation v˜t ≥ E {v˜t}, while column
4 reports the results for the complementary condition. We find that a negative value (-4.28)
prevails over good states, namely those for which v˜t ≥ E {v˜t} , and that a positive value (4.00)
prevails in bad states, namely those for which v˜t < E {v˜t}. This gives clear indication on the
state-contingent nature of the ambiguity attitudes, being averse to entropy deviations in bad
states and opportunistic toward them in good states. According to Lemma 1.3.2 above we know
that θt < 0, which prevails in good states, implies that agents act optimistically. Similarly a
22Data sources are NIPA Tables https://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm, CRSP Indices database
http://www.crsp.com/products/research-products/crsp-historical-indexes, and the Shiller database
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm, respectively
23See Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) for a survey on the relevance of instruments choice in a GMM setting
24This is a specification test of the model itself and it verifies whether the moment conditions are enough
close to zero at some level of statistical confidence, if the model is true and the population moment restrictions
satisfied.
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θt > 0, which prevails in bad states, speaks in favour of pessimism.
To further test our result above we ran unconditional estimation over two different histor-
ical periods. We choose the first to be Great Moderation sample (1985:Q1-2007:Q2), which
captures the boom phase preceding the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The sub-sample representing
the recessionary states is the period following the crisis, namely the (2007:Q3-2016:Q4). Esti-
mations, reported in the last two rows, confirm the same state-contingent nature uncovered in
the conditional estimates. Finally note that for each sample reported the J test fails to reject
model in equation (1.24) at conventional significance levels.
Table 1.2: Estimated Moments of the Pricing Kernel
Moments Λt,t+1 Λ
1
t,t+1 Λ
2
t,t+1
Mean SDF 0.806 0.833 0.967
Standard deviation SDF 8.263 0.332 9.874
Corr(SDF,∆ct) -0.105 -0.999 -0.063
Corr(SDF,Rst+1) -0.081 -0.332 -0.067
Next, given the estimated preference parameters we investigate cyclical properties of the
pricing kernel, namely the empirical SDF. Among other things this also gives indications on
the cyclical properties of the asset price. To this purpose we decompose the SDF in the two
components highlighted above, Λ1t,t+1 and Λ
2
t,t+1, where the latter captures the role of ambiguity
attitudes. For this exercise we use the sample 1980-2016, which among other things is consistent
with the one used later on for the data-model moments comparison. The empirical moments of
the SDF are listed in table 1.2, which shows that the volatility of Λt,t+1 is explained almost in
full by the ambiguity factor Λ2t,t+1. The latter also accounts for a lower correlation with respect
to both consumption and risky returns.
Given the above estimation results the process for θt reads as follows:
θt =
θ− if Vt ≥ EVtθ+ if Vt < EVt (1.25)
We will use this process structure since now on.
1.5 Analytical Results
In this section we derive analytical expressions for asset price, premia and Sharpe ratio and
show their dependence on the optimal LR and the shadow price of debt, µt. The analytical
derivations will allow us to gain first economic intuition on the combined role of occasionally
binding constraints and ambiguity attitudes for asset prices and leverage.
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1.5.1 The Impact of Ambiguity on Asset Prices
Proposition 1.5.1 (Asset Price Recursion). The recursive formula for the asset price over the
infinite horizon in our model reads as follows:
qt = lim
T→∞
Et

T∑
i=1
dt+i
i∏
j=1
Kt+j−1,t+j
 (1.26)
where Kt,t+1 =
Λt,t+1
1−φµ′t
with Λt,t+1 = β
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
mt+1 and µ
′
t =
µt
uc(ct)
.
Proof is described in Appendix A.2.1. The asset price clearly depends upon the optimal LR,
mt+1, and the shadow price of debt, µt. Consider first good states. In this case endogenous
beliefs are right skewed toward the upper tails according to Lemma 1, hence both Λt,t+1 and
Kt,t+1 are higher than when mt+1 = 1 for all positive states. In good states the asset price
grows, due to increase asset demand, but it does so more under optimist beliefs. Similarly
in bad states endogenous beliefs are left-skewed toward the lower tails, hence both Λt,t+1 and
Kt,t+1 are higher than in the case with no ambiguity for all negative states. Asset price falls,
but they do more so with pessimism. This is the sense in which ambiguity attitudes contribute
to the heightened dynamic of the asset price boom and bust cycles. The asset price also depends
upon the shadow price of debt, which proxies the margin or the down-payment requested to
borrowers. When the constraint is binding margins are positive and increasing, in line with
empirical observations (see Geanakoplos (2010)). The higher margins paid by borrowers or the
higher collateral value of the asset is reflected in higher asset prices. This also contributes to
heightened asset price dynamics.
Proposition 1.5.2 (Equity Premium). The return for the risky asset reads as follows:
Et{Rst+1} =
R(1− cov(Λt,t+1, Rst+1)− φµ
′
t)
1− µ′t
(1.27)
while the premium of its return over debt return reads as follows:
Ψt =
1− cov(Λt,t+1, Rst+1)− φµ
′
t
1− µ′t
. (1.28)
whereΛt,t+1 = β
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
mt+1 and µ
′
t =
µt
uc(ct)
.
See Appendix A.2.2 for the proof. The above proposition also shows unequivocally the
dependence of the premia over the beliefs as captured by mt+1 and the shadow price of debt.
While the exact dynamic of the equity premium depends on the solution of the full-model and
upon its general equilibrium effects, we can draw some general conclusions on the dependence
of the equity premium upon the beliefs and the shadow price of debt.
First, a negative covariance between the SDF and the risky asset returns implies that
borrowers are less hedged. This results in a higher return required to hold the risky asset.
The opposite is true for positive covariances. While we cannot say with certainty whether
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the cov(Λt,t+1, R
s
t+1)
25, we know by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality that cov(Λt,t+1, R
s
t+1) ≤√
V ar(Λt,t+1)V ar(Rst+1). Therefore anything that either increases the variance of Λt,t+1 or
Rst+1 will increase their covariance, whether in the positive or the negative domain. Endoge-
nous beliefs formation by inducing fluctuations in mt+1 tend to increase the variance of the
stochastic discount factor which is given by V ar(Λt,t+1) = V ar(β
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
mt+1).
Second, the premium also depends upon the shadow price of debt. Taking as given again
the covariance between the SDF and the risky return, one can compute the following derivative:
∂Ψt
∂µ
′
t
=
(1−φ)−cov(Λt,t+1,Rst+1)
(1−µ′t)2
. If the cov(Λt,t+1, R
s
t+1) is negative the derivative is certainly nega-
tive26. In other words when there are low hedging opportunities a tightening of the constraint
implies that borrowers require higher premia to hold the risky asset. The asset already conveys
poor insurance opportunities, a tightening of the constraint by reducing the asset collateral
value, reduces its demand. Hence borrowers are willing to hold only at higher premia. Endoge-
nous beliefs also play an indirect role in this dependence. Indeed as explained above fluctuations
in beliefs generally raise the absolute value of the covariance. Hence, consider again the case of
a negative covariance. In this case fluctuations in beliefs impair even more the hedging abili-
ties of the risky assets and this in turn increases the premium that borrowers ask in face of a
tightening of the borrowing limit.
Proposition 1.5.3 (Sharpe Ratio). The Sharpe ratio in our model reads as follows:
SR =
Et{zt+1}
σz
=
[
σ2Λ∗t
Λ¯∗2
− 2µ′t
(φ− 1)Et{zt+1}
σ2z
− µ
′2
t
Λ¯∗2
(φ− 1)2
σ2z
] 1
2
(1.29)
where zt+1 = R
s
t+1 − R is the asset excess return Λ¯ is the long run value for the SDF, σ2Λ∗t is
the volatility of the SDF and σ2z is the volatility of the excess return.
Proof is given in Appendix A.2.3. The presence of endogenous beliefs raises the Sharpe ratio
and brings it close to the empirical values as we show in Table 1.4. Matching the empirical
values of the Sharpe ratios is typically hard for models with asset pricing and/or financial
frictions. The reason being that typically an increase in the excess returns of the risky assets
is accompanied by an increase in its volatility. Analytically it is easy to see why the Sharpe
ratio raises in our model. First fluctuations in mt+1 raise fluctuations in the stochastic discount
factor, Λ∗t , hence in its variance. This in turn raises the Sharpe ratio. Second, fluctuations in
θt enhance fluctuation in beliefs, mt+1. Third, the kinked nature of the value function steepens
fluctuations in mt+1 and the SDF also since marginal utilities tend to infinity around the kink.
In turn any increase in the variance of mt+1 raises the variance of Λ
∗
t and the Sharpe ratio.
Intuitively in presence of uncertainty or ambiguity agents require a premium which goes beyond
the one needed to cover risk27 as measured by the volatility of the excess return. If agents knew
25This indeed depends on whether Et(Λt,t+1, Rst+1) > Et(Λt,t+1)Et(Rst+1) or Et(Λt,t+1, Rst+1) <
Et(Λt,t+1)Et(Rst+1).
26If the cov(Λt,t+1, R
s
t+1) > 0, then whether
∂Ψt
∂µ
′
t
is positive or negative depends upon whether the
cov(Λt,t+1, R
s
t+1) > (1− φ) or not.
27Here we refer to the distinction between uncertainty and risk introduce by Knight (1921).
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the objective probability distribution, they would need to be compensated only for bearing tail
risk. As the tail itself is uncertain, borrowers require a higher premia.
In past literature it was noted that the model implied Sharpe ratio can match the empirical
counterpart by assuming implausibly large values for the risk-aversion parameter (see Cochrane
(2005), chapter 13). In the numerical simulations below we show that this is not the case for
our model.
At last, note also that the Sharpe ratio depends negatively upon the shadow value of debt.
When the constraint binds borrowers start to de-leverage and to reduce the demand of risky
asset. As a result this reduces the expected excess returns relatively to the return on debt. This
is compatible with the pro-cyclical nature of the returns on risky assets observed in the data.
1.6 Quantitative Results
In this section we solve the model numerically employing a global solution method, namely policy
function iterations with occasionally binding constraints. We provide details on the solution
method in Appendix A.3. We group our results in three. First, we search for the optimal model
calibration. To do so we choose some target moments in the data and we search for the set of
parameters that minimizes the distance between the targets and the model-implied moments.
This gives further empirical validation of our model. Second, under the optimal calibration we
verify if the model can match several volatilities and correlations for asset prices, returns, equity
premia and leverage. We show that in fact the model does it well. At last, under this optimal
calibration we examine policy functions and we conduct a crisis event exercise. Our main result
is that with ambiguity the model produces steeper asset prices and leverage increases in booms,
which are then followed by sharper de-leverage and crises in recessions.
1.6.1 Calibration Strategy
This section describes the calibration strategy. We divide the set of structural parameters in
three groups. The first group includes parameters which are calibrated using external infor-
mation. Those are the risk free rate, the loan-to-value ratio, the fraction of financial wealth
over total wealth. The second group includes parameters calibrated using a matching moments
routine. Those are θ, the absolute risk aversion coefficient, the discount factor and the volatil-
ity of the income process. The third group includes parameters which are calibrated with the
estimation of the income process, more specifically the autocorrelation of the income process.
Table 1.3 summarizes the results of the calibration procedure.
In order to calibrate the second group of parameters, we choose to match six empirical
moments (the matching is shown in Table 1.4, where also other moments are displayed), namely
the volatility of debt σb, the autocorrelation of debt ρb, the correlation between debt and
consumption Corr(∆bt,∆ct), the expected return on risky asset Et(Rst ), the volatility of return
on risky asset σR
s
, the correlation between return on risky asset and consumption growth
Corr(Rst ,∆ct). To compute the empirical equivalent we focus on the data sample 1980:Q1-
2016:Q4, which captures a period of both of large debt growth and subsequent de-leverage.
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More details on the data sources are in Appendix A.4. We do not include the equity premium
among our targets because the risk free rate is exogenous in the model, but we show later on
that our model can match it well. Note that while the income shock correlation is directly
estimated in the data, its volatility is instead calibrated. It is indeed well known from past
literature that estimated values exhibit large measurement errors (see Heaton and Lucas (1996)
and Deaton (1991)).
Table 1.3: Values for the calibrated parameters
Parameter Meaning Strategy Value
R Risk-free rate 3month T-bill rate 1.0114
φ Loan-to-value ratio Crises Probability 0.15
α Share of dividend Fraction of financial wealth 0.10
θ Penalty parameter Matching Moments -1.35
γ Risk aversion Matching Moments 2.075
β Discount factor Matching Moments 0.930
σy Income Volatility Matching Moments 0.0415
ρy Income Persistence Estimation 0.634
The matching moment routine starts from the following grids: σy ∈ [0.02, 0.07] for the
states of the income shock, β = [0.92, 0.98], γ = [1, 2.2], and finally θt ∈ {[−5, 5], 100}28. In
the grid for θt we introduce the value 100, in order to check if the model with no ambiguity
produces theoretical moments which perform better than our model with waves of optimism
and pessimism. Moreover, the grid is defined between 5 and -5 because out of these bounds the
difference between the model with and without ambiguity becomes negligible.
It is interesting to note that the estimation of the full model through moments matching
equally delivers the same type of state-contingent process for the parameter θt as the one we un-
covered with our GMM estimation above. The estimated values are naturally different between
the two estimation methods, since in the GMM case the regression is based on one equation
summarizing only borrowers’ first order conditions, while in he second case the estimation in-
volves the full set of model equations. But the fact that the two estimations deliver the same
type of state-contingent process is important.
1.6.2 Empirical Moments Matching
In this section we evaluate the model’s ability to match the empirical moments under the
optimal calibration determined above. We also compare the theoretical moments of our model
with ambiguity attitudes (labelled AA since now on) with those of the equivalent model but
with rational expectation (labelled RE since now on). The following Table 1.4 summarizes the
main results:
28For each parameter we check that the optimal values do not hit the bounds of the grid.
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Table 1.4: Empirical and model-based moments
Moments Mnemonics Empirical Model AA1 Model RE
Matched Moments
Volatility debt σb 12.52 12.37 7.24
Persistence debt ρb 0.846 0.539 0.331
Cyclicality debt Corr(∆bt,∆ct) 0.668 0.378 0.821
Exp risky return Et(R
s
t ) 9.38 8.19 7.38
Volatility risky returns σR
s
t 16.21 17.46 12.40
Cyclicality risky returns Corr(∆Rst ,∆ct) 0.474 0.989 0.989
Other Relevant Moments
Equity premium Et(R
s
t −R) 8.25 7.05 6.24
Sharpe ratio
Et(Rst−R)
σR
s
t−R
0.522 0.404 0.503
SDF2 Et(Λt,t+1) 0.806 0.940 0.939
Volatility SDF σΛt,t+1 8.263 15.10 12.987
Cyclicality SDF Corr(Λt,t+1,∆ct) -0.105 -0.976 -0.988
Corr SDF with risky returns Corr(Λt,t+1, R
s
t ) -0.081 -0.967 -0.98
Prob(crisis) - 4.003 3.16 4.51
1 Column 2 and 3 compare theoretical moments under ambiguity attitudes versus rational expectation;
2 In the data this refers to the SDF estimated in section (1.4);
3 We do not calculate the empirical frequency of the financial crises but we follow Bianchi and Mendoza
(2015), who derive an average of 4 crises every 100 years in the developed countries.
The upper panel of Table 1.4 shows the matched moments (according to the criteria set in
the previous section), while in the lower panel other relevant moments are shown. The overall
message is that our model fits well the empirical moments. First, it is better capable of matching
empirical debt and risky asset return volatilities, relatively to the RE model. This is so despite
both models exhibit amplification induced by the occasionally binding collateral constraint. This
shows that endogenous beliefs are also needed to explain asset and debt markets dynamics. The
equity premium as well as its cyclical properties are also well captured and again the presence
of ambiguity attitudes seem to improve even above the benchmark model featuring solely the
collateral constraint. As explained in Cochrane (2005) the ability to match contemporaneously
the long run equity premia and asset returns and their cyclical properties is related to the agents’
attitude toward events on the tails. In our model borrowers are endogenously optimistic, hence
risk-takers, on the upper tail, while they are pessimistic, hence risk-sensitive, on the lower
tail. This additional effect, stemming from the endogenous waves of optimism, improves the
ability of the model to match the equity premium and its cyclical properties. In terms of
matching the Sharpe ratio and the empirical SDF, both models seem to perform similarly
and with acceptable performance, thereby showing that the kink induced by the occasionally
binding collateral constraint contributes alone to this result. At last, both model match the
pro-cyclicality of leverage which is well documented in the data. Leverage indeed increases in
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booms due to a combination of exuberance and lax debt constraints and declines in recessions
due to a combination of pessimism and increasing margins, namely borrowers’ down-payments.
Here neither our model nor the RE model seem to match the empirical value with precision, as
the first underestimates, while the second overestimates.
At last note, that the model reasonably matches the empirically probability of the crisis.
For the empirical counterpart of such a probability we rely on the value presented in Bianchi
and Mendoza (2015).
1.6.3 Excess Returns Predictability
Before turning to the implications of this model for the unfolding of crises, it is instructive to
conclude our assessment of its empirical validity by examining also the implied excess returns
predictability. In asset pricing this is an important test on whether the model ingredients are
able to account for the sources of risk that drive expected returns. A number of empirical
observations (Fama and French (1988)) established predictability of risk premia through cur-
rent or past price-dividend ratios: the pro-cyclical movements in stock prices generate a large
countercyclical variation in expected risk premia. In macro so far the introduction of habits in
consumption proved successful in providing a theory for return predictability (Campbell and
Cochrane (1999)). Here, along the same logic, we evaluate what is the role of our behavioural
ingredient, given by ambiguity attitudes, in the debate.
Figure 1.1: Price-consumption ratio and stock returns
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Reminding that we first estimate and then define the ambiguity parameter conditioning on
the demeaned value function (v˜t − E(v˜t)), we assess in Figure 1.1 the model’s implied price-
dividend and risk premia determination in terms of our ambiguity attitudes. Note that the
plot reports results for 3 realizations of the income process. More importantly when the level
of the value function positively departs from its mean we’re in an region where agents displays
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ambiguity-seeking behaviours, while ambiguity aversion prevails for negative deviations. Then,
compatibly with our analytical results in Proposition 1.5.1 we conclude that ambiguity attitudes
map crucially into the price-dividend ratio generating asset price build-ups and low equity
returns under ambiguity seeking; while asset price bursts and high returns under ambiguity
aversion.
From these results the intuition that since the type of beliefs deviation depends on the realiza-
tions of the demeaned value function and we showed that the latter maps into the price-dividend
ratio, then measuring return predictability over the price-dividend ratio (or the dividend yields)
would account for the influence of ambiguity attitudes. How they intervene in the ability of the
model to forecast future risk premia is evaluated through a return predictability regression (see
also Fama and French (1988) and Cochrane (2011)) of future excess returns, at various horizons
k, on the dividend yield, dtqt , using both historical and model’s simulated data. The regression
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we consider is the following:
Et{Rst+k} − Et{Rt+k} = a+ b
dt
qt
+ εt+k (1.30)
Table1.5 reports the results, comparing empirical evidence and model’s performance. For the
former, the estimated coefficients are positive: high dividend yields reliably anticipate periods
of high returns. Predictability however proves to be poor in the short-run, but increases with
the forecasting horizon, as widely stated in the related literature. Model’s results, in the second
panel of the table, are instead much more significant and informative at all horizons. Moreover,
the comparison between the model with ambiguity attitudes (labelled AA as usual) and the
model without (labelled RE as usual) highlights the role of ambiguity, which by affecting the
price-dividend ratio (as in Figure 1.1) is responsible for substantially higher excess returns
predictability.
Table 1.5: Excess return predictability regression
Historical data: 1960-2016 AA Model RE Model
Horizon (years) dtqt t
(
dt
qt
)
R2 dtqt t
(
dt
qt
)
R2 dtqt t
(
dt
qt
)
R2
1 1.06 0.60 0.01 18.57 8.42 0.58 7.08 6.20 0.38
5 11.44 1.94 0.06 26.03 11.0 0.54 10.37 6.04 0.37
7 26.04 4.87 0.17 30.66 7.81 0.54 11.88 6.14 0.38
10 54.87 5.90 0.28 35.16 5.27 0.52 11.34 5.46 0.26
1.6.4 Policy Function and Crisis Event
We have argued that our leverage cycle model with state-contingent beliefs’ distortions has
a sound empirical ground. The estimated SDF implied by our model shows that the role
29Estimation is done through overlapping OLS regression, standard errors are computed based on Hansen and
Hodrick (1980). Data for this estimation are the price-dividend ratio for the S&P stock returns from the Shiller
Database and the 3-months T-bill rate from CRSP Indices Database.
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of ambiguity attitudes is significant and sizeable. Under the estimated ambiguity parameter
and the empirically optimal calibration, we also showed that our model can account well for
several asset price and leverage moments. This second exercise serves a cross-check of the model
empirical validity.
Given the above, we proceed describing the dynamic properties of our model in comparison
to the RE benchmark and by focusing in particular on the leverage and asset price cycles and
on the unfolding of a crisis. We do so in two steps. First, we plot policy functions of debt and
asset prices. Next, we simulate a crisis event.
Figure 1.2: Policy functions for debt and asset prices
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Borrowing and Asset Pricing decisions
Figure 1.2 below shows the decision rules for debt and asset prices with respect to past debt
holdings across the model with ambiguity attitudes, labelled AA (red line) and the model with
rational expectations, labelled RE (blue line). Note that the full set of policy functions can be
found in Appendix A.5. We interpret the results distinguishing between positive (+5% from
income trend; left panels) and negative realizations of the shock (−5% from trend; right panels)
in order to appreciate the non-linearity arising by the changing ambiguity attitudes over the
different states of the economy. Moreover, in each panel the kink separates the constrained
from the unconstrained region and it represents the point at which the collateral constraint
is marginally binding in each economy. Finally, the intersection between the 45 degree line
and the policy function defines the stationary levels of debt. Several considerations emerge.
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First, both economies are able to produce the V-shaped bond holdings decision rules, which
are a typical feature of models with high deleveraging and financial crises (see e.g. Bianchi
(2011) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2015)). To the right of the kink the policy functions are
upward-sloping, corresponding to the unconstrained values of debt, while to the left they are
downward-sloping identifying the constrained region where next-period bond holdings decrease
in current bond holding. The kinked policy functions for asset prices follow accordingly: they
increase with wealth and more steeply in the constrained region.
Figure 1.3: Debt Amplification Dynamics
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Second, the policy function for the AA model moves away from the one under RE both in
the scale of the dynamics in each region and in the position of the kinks. In particular, given a
negative state of the economy, higher previous-period debt induces a binding constraint earlier,
increasing the probability of lying in the financial amplification region. The opposite holds
for booms, where optimism boosts the collateral values, which in turn relaxes the constraint
and facilitates the build-up of leverage. Thus, given the shifted location of the binding and
slack regions, debt choices under AA, when constrained, associate a sharper or a more damped
contraction in debt whether the economy is in booms or in busts. This nonlinearity reflects
optimistic and pessimistic attitudes toward future realizations and generates amplification dy-
namics in the leverage cycles. We will visualize the size of this result below. At last, focusing
on the asset price panels the comparison between the two models turns to be quite interesting.
Asset prices in the AA model lie always above the RE benchmark in booms and always below
in busts, which is coherent with the ability of the AA model to associate to a given initial debt
position more debt and less debt, respectively for the two income states. Next we compute how
large would be the extent of a de-leverage when the steady state of the economy is perturbed
by a one-period 5% fall in income. This exercise offers a clear visualization of the enhanced
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financial amplification dynamics produced by AA, keeping the parallel with the RE model.
Figure 1.3 reproduces the following experiment. Assume that the two economies lie in
equilibrium in A and B, respectively. Then, at the time of the shock the new negative realization
of income forces a sharp upward adjustment of the bond decision rules and the temporary
equilibria jump to C and D. The arrows define a drop in bond holdings which results to be much
more pronounced for the model under the AA model. Interestingly, the AA model generates a
drop of -33.9%, which exceeds the RE equivalent by about 10 points. This speaks about the
model’s quantitative relevance in producing amplified leverage cycles.
Financial Crises
The crisis event displayed in Figure 1.4 proves the model’s ability to generate financial crises
and studies relevant macro dynamics around it. More in detail, the event analysis is realized
using model-simulated data for the two economies, AA and RE, and defining as crises the
events in which the collateral constraint binds and the current account is at least two standard
deviations above the trend. Then, we construct seven-periods event windows centred on the
crisis to analyse pre- and post-crises patterns.
Figure 1.4: Crises Event Study
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From the comparison between the two economies lies in the ability of the model with AA
to account for stronger build-up of leverage prior to the crisis (around +3%) and sharper
de-leveraging at the crisis (around -7%). Again the role of the state contingent distortion is
important in understanding this dynamic. In booms optimism boosts collateral values, relaxing
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the constraint and facilitates the build-up of leverage. In recessions the opposite is true. Pes-
simism induces assets’ fire sales, this generates sharper declines of the collateral values forcing
borrowers to de-leverage earlier and more severely. Accordingly, looking at asset prices, con-
sumption and equity returns helps understanding the results around debt decisions. Indeed, all
of them display more severe dynamics under ambiguity aversion. The asset price collapses, for
instance, playing an important role in explaining the more pronounced decline in debt under
the AA model, reflecting a strong Fisherian deflation mechanism. Moreover, consumption falls
2 percentage points more and the risky return results to drive the enhanced pre- and post-crisis
debt patterns, falling more sharply in booms and increasing when the crisis occurs.
1.6.5 Intermediation Sector and Intermediation Shocks
Lack of transparency and ambiguity play an important role in crises developments as we showed
so far, but by no means instability stemming from the intermediation sector, hence originating
in the credit supply, has a major role too. This is particularly true within the context of the
2007-2008 financial crisis. While including all possible sources of intermediation disincentives
is beyond the scope of this paper, we nevertheless wish to assess the role of the intermediation
channel. This is important as one should test whether the beliefs-related channels described so
far persist even when the supply side of credit is inserted in the model. In fact, we find that
not only the role of ambiguity attitudes is preserved, but in most cases is amplified and the
interaction with the intermediation channels is compelling.
We introduce intermediation by assigning the role of debt monitoring to a bank. This is
actually realistic since atomistic lenders do not monitor or screen debtors individually, but
largely assign this function to an intermediary. In this context the collateral constraint results
from the bank design of a debt contract that is incentive compatible, meaning that it reduces the
incentives of the borrower to divert resources and default. We formalize this type of contracts
and show how the collateral constraint emerges from such incentive compatibility constraint in
Appendix A.7 Within this context an intermediation shock, which suddenly tightens the supply
of credit, affects the parameter governing the loan-to-value ratio, φ, which itself governs the
strength of the incentive problems. Intuitively the shock can be interpreted in two ways, both
affecting the contractual agreement in a similar vein. It could capture financial innovation in
the form of derivatives and/or asset back securities issuance, which being pervasive prior to the
crisis, allowed banks to off-load credit risk and reduced the tightness of the debt contract. A
sudden freeze of the asset backed market liquidity due for instance to the sub-prime shock would
have then induced a sudden fall in φ. A second interpretation, linked to the first, is that higher
availability of liquidity30 prior to the crisis had lessened banks’ monitoring incentives, something
which resulted in higher loan-to-value ratios, φ. After the crisis occurs, the squeeze in liquidity,
hence banks’ funding, could suddenly tightens the loan-to-value ratio. Both interpretations,
which are realistic particularly in the context of the recent financial crisis, have the effect of
30This again could be due either to the possibility of raising additional bank liabilities through asset backed
securities or through the ample availability of liquidity in interbank and repos markets prior to the 2007-2008
crisis.
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producing a sudden tightening of credit supply. Within this context we subject our model to an
intermediation shock to φ and assess its role as well as its interaction with ambiguity attitudes.
We do so by analysing again policy functions, crisis events and second moments of the model.
Before proceeding to the assessment of the quantitative results, a few words are needed
regarding the calibration of the shock. We define a high and a low level of the loan-to-value
ratio, respectively φl = 0.22 and φh = 0.28, calibrated in order to match the empirical volatility
of debt. The shock then follows a two-state regime-switching Markov process, with a transition
matrix calibrated to replicate the empirical probability and duration of the crises events, as in
Bianchi and Mendoza Bianchi and Mendoza (2015). More in detail, the probability to remain
in a high state, pihh is set equal to 0.955 in order to match a frequency of crises close to 4%,
while the transition probability from a low to high state pilh is equal to one, implying a one
year duration of the crises. The remaining transition probabilities are set as complements of
the previous ones, i.e pihl = 1− pihh and pill = 1− pilh.
Figure 1.5: Crises Event Study with income and intermediation shock
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Time periods
-30
-20
-10
0
10
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 ch
an
ge
 fr
om
 e
rg
od
ic 
m
ea
n Asset Price
RE
AA
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Time periods
-20
0
20
40
60
80
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 ch
an
ge
 fr
om
 e
rg
od
ic 
m
ea
n Equity Premium
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Time periods
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 ch
an
ge
 fr
om
 e
rg
od
ic 
m
ea
n Debt
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Time periods
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 ch
an
ge
 fr
om
 e
rg
od
ic 
m
ea
n Consumption
We start in this case from a crisis event, since this makes immediately visible the role of
the credit supply for the crisis development on top of the role of ambiguity attitudes. Figure1.5
compares the crisis event in the model with ambiguity attitudes and with rational expectations.
The crisis event is defined as before, but now it is triggered by a combination of income and
intermediation shocks. Specifically, we simulate the model in response to both shocks, we then
observe that the crisis originates exactly when both shocks turn negative. The Figure shows
two interesting facts. First, the role of ambiguity attitudes remains. It is still true that beliefs
formation by affecting the value of collateral through endogenous skewed beliefs induce sharper
crises than under the case with no ambiguity. Second and interestingly, this time the drop in
the crisis is even larger. This is reasonable since now both credit demand side and supply side
components are operative. Intuitively the steepness of the crises now depends on two channels.
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As before the positive skewed beliefs, valid prior to the crisis, induced higher demand for leverage
and the negative skewed beliefs, materializing after the crisis, induce de-leveraging. On top of
this the progressive reduction of φ facilitates debt supply prior to the crisis and produces a
credit crunch after the crisis.
To examine more in details the intermediation channel we examine the policy functions for
debt and asset prices. Figure 1.6a below shows the policy functions conditional to positive
realizations of the income shock for asset prices and debt by comparing various scenarios. In
the first column we compare the model with ambiguity attitudes for two values of φ. This case
allows us to isolate only the contribution of credit supply. As before the kink represents the
turn in which the constraint shifts from binding to non-binding. The comparison shows that a
low φ, namely tight credit due to high monitoring standards or low availability of liquidity, has
two effects. On the one side, it enlarges the constrained region. On the other side, it reduces
leverage, and this effect can be beneficial in the medium to long run. The second and the
third columns compare the models with and without ambiguity attitudes, respectively for low
levels of φ (second column) and high levels of φ (third column). Two interesting observations
emerge. First, as before under the model with ambiguity attitudes asset prices are higher and
debt displays the previously underlined nonlinear dynamics over constrained and unconstrained
regions. This as before is due to the nature of the positive skewed beliefs that emerge under
positive income shocks. Second, the comparison between a high and a low level of φ shows that
the qualitative pattern of the policy functions remains unaltered, albeit the constrained region
is expanded under the low loan to value ratio. In other words, the forces operating through the
ambiguity channel remain active even when introducing supply side elements. The dominant
effect of the latter is more evident in terms of changes in the size of the constrained region.
To fully complete the assessment of the policy functions Figure 1.6b shows the results for the
policy functions conditional on negative income realizations. The message is largely symmetric
to the one described above.
At last, we ask whether the introduction of the intermediation shock can improve upon the
moment matching and if so along which dimension. Table1.6 below shows again the comparison
of a selected numbers of second moments between the data, the model with and without am-
biguity attitudes. This time the comparison is done by simulating the model also in response
to the intermediation shock. The addition of the intermediation shock preserves most of the
previous moments and improves in terms of data matching along other dimensions. The Table
highlights primarily moments that change with the introduction of the intermediation shock.
The most noteworthy result is that the introduction of credit supply fluctuations increases debt
pro-cyclicality, which as discussed before, is an important stylized fact. The reason is intuitive.
The double occurrence of the negative income and credit supply shock tightens leverage much
more sharply. Equally the double-coincidence of the positive income and credit supply realiza-
tions heightens the build-up of leverage. Those movements on the tails help to increase average
pro-cyclicality. The volatility of debt is also somewhat higher, mostly so in the model with am-
biguity attitudes, and is closer to the data value. This again might be due to the contribution
of the tails. On the other side, it shall be mentioned that the introduction of the intermediation
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Figure 1.6: Policy Functions for the model with intermediation
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(b) Negative intermediary shock realization
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shock worsens the volatility of risky returns, which now goes above the one detected in the
data. This effect is possibly due to the fact that our model does not account for loss absorption
capacity of the intermediation sector in terms of equity capital and/or liquidity buffers. Those
elements would indeed limit the extent of fire sales in risky assets when credit supply tightens,
hence they would reduce fluctuations in asset prices.
Table 1.6: Selected empirical and model-based moments
Moments Mnemonics Empirical Model AA Model RE
Matched Moments
Volatility debt σb 12.52 11.55 9.78
Persistence debt ρb 0.846 0.432 0.385
Cyclicality debt Corr(∆bt,∆ct) 0.668 0.792 0.795
Exp risky return Et(R
s
t ) 9.38 8.67 7.88
Volatility risky returns σR
s
t 16.21 23.45 19.40
Cyclicality risky returns Corr(∆Rst ,∆ct) 0.474 0.983 0.992
Equity premium Et(R
s
t −R) 8.255 7.013 7.050
Prob(crisis) - 4.0 4.06 5.53
To sum up the main contribution of the intermediation channel in our model is that of
modifying the size of the constrained versus the unconstrained region, that of contributing to
explain the severity of a financial crisis and that of contributing to explain debt pro-cyclicality.
1.7 Conclusions
Financial crisis are most often triggered by endogenous instability in debt markets. The latter
are typically characterized by collateral constraints and opacity in asset values. Under lack of
transparency the beliefs formation process acquires an important role since eventually it affects
the value of collateral and with it the debt capacity. The narrative of most crises depict sharp
increases in debt and asset prices prior to them and sharp reversal afterwards.
We therefore introduce in a model in which borrowers fund risky assets through debt and
are subject to occasionally binding collateral constraints, beliefs formation, driven by ambiguity
attitudes that endogenously induce optimism in booms and pessimism in recessions. In booms
optimistic borrowers demand more risky assets, which results in higher asset price growth (com-
pared to the case with only collateral constraints), and lever up more. In recessions pessimistic
borrowers de-leverage sharply and off load risky assets. This beliefs formation process coupled
with the occasionally binding nature of the collateral constraint is a crucial element in explain-
ing the combined amplified dynamic of asset prices and leverage as well as the whole span of
their long run and short run statistics. Importantly we assess the empirical validation of our
model both through GMM estimation of the Euler equation and through data-model moment
matching.
Chapter 2
Synchronization in Sovereign and
Financial Vulnerability
2.1 Introduction
Following the global financial crisis, a number of European countries experienced strong in-
creases in both sovereign and private debt interest rate spreads. The common view about the
surge in spreads is that they reflect a vicious spiral of fiscal and financial distress (Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009)): on the one hand, sovereign risk feeds back into banks’ fragility through
their balance sheet exposure to government imbalances; on the other hand, banks’ risk spills
to sovereign instability when it calls for government guarantees and for its recessionary impli-
cations throughout credit contractions. In parallel, moreover, a growing attention is devoted
to the determinants of rising sovereign risk premia, with the ultimate goal to discuss policy
implications. One view addresses the deterioration of the fiscal outlook priced by markets as
entirely driven by the worsening of macro fundamentals, where the debt-to-GDP ratio is gener-
ally conceived as the most significant variable at the roots of the sovereign capacity to service
debt obligations (see Yeyati and Panizza (2011) and Mendoza and Yue (2012)). Under this
perspective, reforms of fiscal consolidation are justified. A more critical view (Calvo (1988)),
instead, believes that expectations-driven factors, weakly related to debt dynamics, generate
confidence crises, which severely inject financial panic in sovereign and financial markets. This
theory calls for interventions on markets’ miss-pricing, as at least complements of fiscal cor-
rections. We perform an empirical analysis to intervene jointly on the two debates. By using
Markov-switching methods, we design a small-scale framework which captures, given our identi-
fication strategy, endogenous feedback dynamics between corporate and sovereign spreads, and
a measure of macro risk, given by the debt-to-GDP ratio. We then evaluate the properties of
the model under the realizations of regimes, identified on two independent sources of macro-
financial instability: one addressing the link between debt sustainability and sovereign yields;
the other interesting the private-sovereign risk nexus.
In order to grasp a first intuition on the mechanisms under study, Figure 2.1 shows some
data properties for Italy, Spain and Portugal, selected as reference countries having recently
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experienced both fiscal strain and increased spreads. We report here the evolution, since 2003
up to the end of 2016, of sovereign and private spreads, along with that of the macroeconomic
fundamentals, summarized by the general government debt-to-GDP ratio. For the sovereign
and private rate we take the 10-year government bond and the lending rate for non-financial
corporate debt (over 5 years maturity), respectively; while the German 6-month Zero-Coupon
Bonds (ZCB) is assumed to be the risk-free asset. The grey areas identify the financial and
sovereign debt crises, respectively.
Figure 2.1: Sovereign Debt and Spreads. Italy, Spain, Portugal
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The dynamics displayed in Figure 2.1 signal that strong nonlinearities characterize the
sovereign risk channel. Both the linkage between the debt ratio and the sovereign bond spread
and that between the latter and the non-financial corporate spread can be interestingly dis-
cussed decoupling the sample between the crises period and the pre and post crisis. Until the
unfolding of the 2008 burst, fiscal balances, with an average debt-to-GDP ratio of 81%, were not
perceived as a looming concern, as signalled by low spreads on sovereign debt (on average 1.5%)
and private credit (1.55%). However, that was a period in which good growth performance and
a benign financial environment masked the accumulation of an array of macroeconomic and
financial vulnerabilities (Lane (2012)). Since 2008, indeed, the severe global financial crisis in-
jected abruptly high risk on the markets. With the collapse of Lehman Brother, private spreads
raised at 5.81%, and public spreads aligned at 3.75%. Financial instability shook the area-wide
system and, while the main focus of the political agenda was on the banking system (calming
private spreads), markets’ concerns moved to address country-specific fiscal risks. Indeed, fiscal
imbalances were gradually worsening, increasing at an 8% annual rate between 2008 and the end
of 2012. In parallel, sovereign spreads never decreased since 2008 and started to diverge from
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private spreads when the sovereign debt crisis hit. For Italy the public spread against Germany
reached 7.16% in 2011, without reflecting an apparent fundamental macro change. Markets’
fear, investors’ pessimism or policy uncertainty were contributing to the surge in spreads. This
has been even clearer with Draghi’s speech1, which curbed agents’ expectations and, with them,
private and public spreads, inducing a new scenario of stability around an average level of debt
at 124% of GDP.
The analysis of the linkages between fiscal imbalances, sovereign spread and private spreads
allows us to capture two main interesting facts. First of all, what clearly stems from this
evidence is that both relatively low and high government imbalances are consistent with low-risk
economic environments. This pattern is clearly displayed in the scatter plot on the bottom left
of Figure 2.1, where both low and high levels of debt are associated with low sovereign spreads,
whereas for intermediate debt realizations the relationship describes a more defined tendency.
Overall, we find that the debt-to-GDP alone accounts for only 20% of sovereign risk variability,
suggesting that, as long as fundamentals are the ultimate cause of risk premia, markets proved
unable to provide a correct pricing of risk (De Grauwe and Ji (2013)). These results can be
interpreted stating that the dynamics in place during the crises might be determined or might
be interacting with additional latent factors (expectation-driven or non-fundamental factors)
feeding sources of financial instability. Secondly, the joint analysis of the two spreads (bottom-
right panel) reveals high linear correlation (the sovereign spreads explains a good 46% of private
spreads’ variability). However, also this linkage suggests complex dynamics: the high degree of
synchronization between the two risk proxies decreased after the first crisis and broke down with
the second one, when private spreads reacted more timidly but more persistently. Since then,
the two spreads followed different trajectories: private spreads remained high, while sovereign
spreads faced a sharp drop. We can again attribute the change in the degree of coordination
between sovereign and private risks to latent (potentially different) factors.
Based on these puzzling evidences, the paper aims to empirically identify latent sources
of risk underlying both the transmission of debt surges to sovereign spreads and the channel
linking sovereign to private risk pricing. By estimating a small-scale Markov-Switching Vector
Autoregression (MS-VAR) for a pooled sample of European countries (Italy, Spain and Portu-
gal) in three variables (private spreads, sovereign spreads, debt-to-GDP ratio), we derive macro
evidence about the emergence of substantial regime changes affecting independently two main
structural relationships in the model. On one hand, we efficiently extract regimes of different
degrees of sensitivity of sovereign risk pricing to debt dynamics. We address them as driven by
a latent factor feeding uncertainty, fear or pessimism in the determination of sovereign spreads.
We will, therefore, refer to them as vulnerability regimes. On the other hand, the channel con-
necting sovereign to private spreads fluctuations displays regularities of strong and loose degrees
of tightness. The implied regimes are defined as synchronization regimes. Two main considera-
tions emerge from the analysis: i) from an historical assessment of the identified regimes, high
sovereign vulnerability to debt seems to broadly characterize the peak of the global financial
1Speech at the Global Investment Conference in London 26 July 2012, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/
key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html
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crisis and the different phases of the sovereign debt crisis, while high risk synchronization marks
mainly the first phases of both crises; ii for a quantification of the regime-specific dynamics, we
simulate a debt-to-GDP shock, which induces a more than two times larger surge in sovereign
spreads under the high vulnerability regime. This nonlinear effect spills over private spreads,
which are in turn directly interested by an additional source of risk amplification under the high
synchronization regime.
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the related literature. Section 2.3
describes the MS-VAR estimation procedure, while its results are presented and discussed in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This chapter relates to two distinct strands of the macro literature. First, it contributes to the
literature on the nexus between sovereign and bank risk. Robust empirical evidence uncovering
the strong co-movements between sovereign and financial crises can be found in Diebold and
Yilmaz (2009), in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) with aggregate data, and in Gennaioli, Martin and
Rossi (2014) with cross-country panel data on banks. Theoretically, numerous papers address
the different channels feeding the ’doom loop’. Bocola (2016) studies the impact of sovereign risk
on banks’ balance sheets, credit provision and output losses. Faia (2017) intervenes in the debate
modelling a more comprehensive set of sovereign risk mechanisms, featuring a balance sheet, a
collateral and a liquidity channel. Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2014), Cooper and Nikolov
(2017), and Farhi and Tirole (2016) analyse the nexus under the lens of banks’ bailouts incentives
and costs. Finally, Konig, Kartik and Heinemann (2014) employ a global game approach to
show that the credibility and effectiveness of the guarantees are intertwined with the sovereign
funding risk. Exploiting the properties of a MS-VAR, we contribute to the literature identifying
regimes where a sizeable sovereign-banking nexus recurrently alternates with a normal scenario,
where the related linkage is negligible. We analyse the financial amplification coming from the
implied risk loop in a setup where fiscal imbalances carry themselves a relevant source of macro
risk. To the best of our knowledge this is the first contribution applying MS techniques to this
topical area.
We also relate to the literature on self-fulfilling debt crises, which aims to account for the
role of expectations-driven factors in explaining sovereign risk fluctuations. Bocola and Dovis
(2017), using the modelling framework of self-fulfilling rollover crises a´ la Cole and Kehoe (2000),
provides the first quantitative measurement of the fundamental versus non-fundamental descrip-
tion of sovereign spreads during the Eurozone crisis. The literature extensively investigates on
the occurrence of multiple equilibria at the origin of non-fundamental sovereign risk sources.
Indeed, descriptions of alternative mechanisms date back to Calvo (1988), but are also recently
studied by Lorenzoni and Werning (2014), Ayres et al. (2016) and Broner et al. (2014). We
do not explicitly model non-fundamental equilibria but we empirically interpret them using the
concept of latent factors. They are assumed to be induced by uncertainty, lack of trust or policy
credibility, which alter the degree of vulnerability of markets’ pricing to fiscal fluctuations. Our
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main contribution concerns the analysis of the role of latent (non-fundamental) factors, not
only in terms of transmission of fiscal imbalances to sovereign risk, but also in terms of implied
co-movement between sovereign and private spreads.
2.3 MS -VAR evidence
We evaluate the low-frequency nonlinearities in the structural relations linking sovereign, private
credit spreads and macroeconomic fundamentals by estimating a Markov-switching VAR model
(MS-VAR) on monthly data spanning the period 2003:M1-2016:M12. We run the analysis on a
pool of three countries: Italy, Spain and Portugal. Aggregation is realized with HICP weights.
Three variables are considered in the MS-VAR: the private lending spread, the sovereign spread
and the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Sovereign spreads are measured by yields differentials
between long-term debt rates and a German ZCB with a residual maturity of 6 months; private
spreads are, instead, given by the yield differential between the lending rate for the non-financial
corporate debt and the German ZCB. Finally, the nominal value of general government debt is
scaled over GDP. A detailed description of variables’ definitions and data sources is available in
Appendix B.1.
Regime-switching dynamics are introduced by adding two channels of parameters’ instabil-
ity in the systematic component of the VAR: i) one affects the equation for sovereign spreads,
according to the latent variable ξvul, which defines the vulnerability regimes; ii) the other con-
trols the equation for private spreads, according to the latent variable ξsyn, which defines the
synchronization regimes. An independent Markov chain ξvol in the stochastic component of the
VAR, i.e. governing the variance-covariance matrix, captures shocks’ heteroskedasticity. There-
fore, in this nonlinear setting the exogenous determination of low-frequency switches in model’s
coefficients defines stochastically-generated regimes, which have to be interpreted conditionally
to the shocks’ size.
Collecting the two independent Markov chains affecting the model’s structural parameters,
under the composite process ξsp = {ξvul, ξsyn}, the following Bayesian MS-VAR model is con-
sidered:
y
′
tA0(ξ
sp
t ) = c(ξ
sp
t ) +
ρ∑
i=1
y
′
t−iAi(ξ
sp
t ) + 
′
tΣ(ξ
vol
t )
−1 (2.1)
where yt is the three-dimensional vector of endogenous variables, c(ξ
sp
t ) the vector of constants,
A0(ξ
sp
t ) the invertible matrix of the contemporaneous correlations, ρ the lag length, Ai(ξ
sp
t )
the autoregressive dynamic cross-correlations. We fix ρ = 13, as suggested by AIC information
criteria2. A conditional multivariate normal distribution for the orthogonal structural shocks t
is assumed:3
2Ivanov and Kilian (2005) implement MCMC simulations to conclude that for monthly VAR models the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) tends to produce the most accurate structural and semi-structural impulse
response estimates for realistic sample sizes
3Conditional normality over the reduced-form residuals space opens up a much wider class of distributions for
the error terms than the unconditional normality, meeting non-Gaussian evidence in applied works.
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P (t|Yt−1,Ξt, θ, q) = N(t|0n, In) (2.2)
where the structural shocks’ standard deviations are given by the diagonal elements of the
matrix Σ−1(ξvolt ), θ denotes the vector of model’s structural parameters, Ξt and Yt−1 collect
past information on the latent processes and data, respectively. Regimes’ dynamics are driven
by the composite process of two independent chains ξt = {ξspt , ξvolt }, otherwise interpretable in
Bayesian analysis as a vector of nuisance parameters, which obeys the first-order Markovian
property p(ξt|Yt−1, θ, q,Ξt−1) = qξt,ξt−1 . The transition probabilities qi,j to go from state i
to state j are collected in the composite transition matrix Q = (qi,j)(i,j)∈H×H) ∈ <h2 , where
H = {1...h} is the set of possible regimes for ξt, and Q is nonlinearly restricted to the tensor
product form Q = Qsp ⊗ Qvol. We allow for two regimes per Markov chain and estimate the
MS-VAR model by using Bayesian methods. Appendix B.2 provides the estimation details.
2.3.1 Model Identification
Identification is achieved by means of exclusion restrictions on both the contemporaneous and
the dynamic structure of the VAR (Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008), Waggoner and Zha (2003)).
As Figure 2.2 illustrates, we employ the following scheme of assumptions regarding the interac-
tions between model’s variables. The two-sided link between debt-to-GDP and sovereign spread
is left free to display its contemporaneous and dynamic effects, both in terms of higher fiscal
burden induced by sovereign spreads changes on the debt-to-GDP ratio, and in terms of higher
risk pricing coming from high debt levels. The channel between sovereign and private spreads
is, instead, allowed to hold only in the direction from sovereign to private risk. We, therefore,
account for the balance-sheet effects operating through the banks’ exposure to government bond
holdings, ruling out the reverse direction of causation, contemporaneously and dynamically4.
The latter operates only indirectly through the linkages connecting banks’ credit contractions
to drops in production and rise of fiscal guarantees supporting banks. Debt-to-GDP does not
directly determine private spreads neither on impact nor at dynamically. Sovereign spread is
assumed to react with a one-month delay to fiscal unexpected shocks. Identification (global and
local) is tested and verified through the methods of Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2010),
designed for restrictions on Markov-switching models.
The peculiar feature of our analysis intervenes in two nodes: i) the determination of sovereign
spreads (red node), which - given our identifying assumptions - depend only on the fiscal variable;
ii) the determination of private spreads (blue node), which, instead, depend only on sovereign
spreads. Two independent latent drivers are responsible for significantly divergent nonlinear
transmission channels featuring the origins and the pass-through of sovereign risk.
4Moody’s (2004), in assessing how credit risk linkages vary over time, documents a chain of spillover effects
operating mainly in the direction from sovereign to financial stress, for the cases of Italy and Greece.
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Figure 2.2: VAR Identification Scheme
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2.3.2 Model Selection
Here we evaluate our switching structure in terms of model fit. Table 2.1 reports the log
Marginal Data Density (MDD) of four differently specified models. The latter are compared
under three measures, which differently specify the weighting function for the MDD’s numerical
approximation: the new modified harmonic mean method (MHM) proposed by Sims, Waggoner
and Zha (2008); the bridge sampling method of Meng and Wong (1996); the Mu¨ller method
(Liu, Waggoner and Zha (2011)). We consider two regimes per chain in every model.
Table 2.1: Marginal Data Densities
Regimes
Methods ξvol {ξvol, ξvul} {ξvol, ξsyn} {ξvol, ξvul, ξsyn}
SWZ(08)’s MHM 529.7685 550.3061 580.9696 592.4230
Bridge sampling 526.7853 546.1993 580.0308 589.0128
Mu¨ller’s 526.5279 546.1991 580.1027 587.7441
A set of results are derived. First, the model with only stochastic volatilities (ξvol), keeping
a time-invariant structure on structural parameters, is clearly outperformed by all other mod-
els. Indeed, by including an independent source of discrete variability on the determination of
sovereign spreads in terms of debt, ({ξvol, ξvul}), or, alternatively, on the sovereign-private risk
pass-through, ({ξvol, ξsyn}), we always improve in terms of model fit over the stochastic volatility
case. Secondly, the latter performs better than the former. Finally and more importantly, the
best-fit model, ({ξvol, ξvul, ξsyn}), entails the inclusion of both risk channels, providing robust
statistical support to our analysis.
2.4 Financial and Fiscal Regimes
Figure 2.3 reports the smoothed probabilities at the posterior mode for the three Markov chains,
obtained by conditioning to the shifts in the covariance matrix (top panel), to the shifts in the
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sovereign spread equation (middle panel), and to the shifts in the private spread equation
(bottom panel). Note that our identification scheme implies that sovereign risk depends only
on debt-to-GDP, as well as private risk depends only on sovereign risk. Only these relationships
are allowed to switch over Markov states. The top panel displays states’ probabilities for
the regime capturing higher shocks’ size. Therefore, we label it the high volatility regime.5
The middle panel, instead, displays probabilities for the regime that we consider as driven by
exogenous factors intervening in rising the degree of vulnerability of sovereign spread to debt-
to-GDP. Thus, we label it the high vulnerability regime. Finally, the bottom panel reports the
regime featuring strong co-movements between sovereign and private spreads. Therefore, we
label it the high synchronization regime. In order to visually facilitate regimes’ interpretation,
the last two plots show also the dynamics of sovereign and private spreads.
Figure 2.3: Posterior States’ Probabilities
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Some considerations are worth noting. The high volatility regime captures two sharp short-
lived events observed with the two abrupt surges in sovereign spreads in 2008 and 2011, lining up
with the dates of the financial and the sovereign debt crises. Differently, the high vulnerability
5On this regard, a large literature preceding the crisis interpreted monetary policy regimes considering het-
eroskedastic error terms only (see Sims and Zha (2006) and Primiceri (2005)). In the last decade, however,
many contributions arose finding strong empirical confirmation of structural deviations from regularities (Bianchi
(2013), Bianchi and Melosi (2017), Bianchi and Ilut (2017), and Hubrich and Tetlow (2015).
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and synchronization regimes are estimated to cover wider entire time windows, mainly around
the two crises, rather than only spikes. This is line with the interpretation of the structural
regimes as covering periods where low-frequency fluctuations prevail and suggest that, albeit
the increase in spreads had its origin in big shocks, the following developments are mainly
explained by structural factors, for which we can provide an economic interpretation. Indeed,
we observe that the high vulnerability regime captures the period when the debt-to-GDP ratio
started its gradual surge and markets were aggressively pricing sovereign and financial risk.
These features describe both crises, but more broadly the sovereign debt turmoil. The high risk
synchronization regime, instead, seem to characterize more the first phases of both the global
and debt crises. See Table B.3 in Appendix for the associated conditional moments.
2.4.1 Impulse Response Analysis
Once derived how the data properties are captured by regime changes, we interpret the regime-
specific economic dynamics by simulating an unexpected worsening in macroeconomic funda-
mentals resulting from a debt-to-GDP surge. The crucial question here is whether, and under
which conditions, fiscal imbalances spill over sovereign and private risk.
Figure 2.4 shows the impulse response functions to a 1% increase in government debt-to-
GDP conditional6 on the different regimes identified in the previous section. Several results are
worth noticing. First of all, both spreads respond positively to the worsening of the fundamental,
highlighting a significant risk’s transmission across the two sectors. Moreover, focusing on the
response of the sovereign spread (the middle panel) we can notice how the degree of transmission
crucially depends on the structural regime in place. Indeed, a strong amplification of the effects,
in terms of size and persistence, is observed for the sovereign spread under what we call the
high vulnerability regime (the red line), while a smaller and a relatively short-lived response
characterizes the complementary regime. More in detail, the chart shows that the peak of
sovereign spread response moves from 3% in the low vulnerability regime to 8% in the high
vulnerability regime.
Finally, the response of the private spread reveals an additional source of nonlinearity char-
acterizing the comovement between private and sovereign spreads, independently on the direct
impact of the debt-to-GDP shock on the sovereign spread. The bottom panel of Figure 2.4 dis-
plays the impulse response functions produced in the four regimes identified by different levels
of vulnerability and synchronization, highlighting how the size of the private spread response
is mainly affected by the degree of risk synchronization. Indeed, when a low synchronization
regime realizes, the response of private spread is negligible, independently on the degree of
vulnerability. Instead, when the high synchronization regimes materializes, the high vulnerabil-
ity realization amplifies an already sizeable response of the private spread. More in detail, we
can see how in the “low vulnerability-high synchronization” regime the private spread response
reaches a peak of 2% while in the “high vulnerability-high synchronization” it raises up to 5%.
To sum-up, the interaction between the two sources of non-linearity, identified by the
6In a Markov-switching model the conditional impulse responses are computed assuming that over the relevant
horizon a specific regime will prevail.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses: Debt-to-GDP shock
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Markov-switching structure, controls the extent to which a worsening in fiscal imbalances is
transmitted to sovereign spreads and, trough this, to the private sector. The realization of a
“high vulnerability-high synchronization” regime defines a situation with the highest risk pricing
in both markets and the most aligned comovement in private and public spreads.
2.4.2 Variance Decomposition Analysis
So far, in Section 2.4 we derived the structural regimes affecting the determination of sovereign
and private risk measures, whose properties are shown to be clearly interpretable in terms of
transmission channels. Indeed, we evaluated the response of our model’s variables by simulating
a shock to the debt-to-GDP ratio. In order to add some evidence on the regimes’ interpretation,
we here quantify the shocks’ relative contributions to the two spreads’ variability, and we analyse
them under the identified regimes. To this purpose, Figure 2.5 selects some results obtained
by a dynamic variance decomposition analysis, performed conditioning on a particular regime
path.
Figure 2.5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
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In particular, the Figure illustrates the contribution of the debt-to-GDP shock to the vari-
ance of sovereign spreads (top panel); as well as the contribution of the sovereign spread shock
to the variance of private spreads (bottom panel). Both are evaluated conditioning on two polar
regimes: a normal times regime, which corresponds to the states’ combination where simulta-
neous low vulnerability and low synchronization realize; the latter is compared to a regime
of high vulnerability and high synchronization, respectively. Both are selected under the low
volatility regime, but no remarkable differences emerge under the high volatility regime. This
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implies that, given our regimes’ identification, the shocks’ size do not seem to matter for this
analysis. Results show that debt shocks explain a 6% and a 2% variation of sovereign spreads
at short horizons, under respectively the high vulnerability and the normal times regimes. The
difference across the two is more remarkable if evaluated at longer horizons, where in normal
times debt shocks seem uninformative, while the high vulnerability regime still captures a per-
sistent degree of contribution. A stronger evidence is, then, derived when assessing the private
spreads’ variance in terms of sovereign spreads’ shocks, under the two scenarios. Indeed, the
second panel of the Figure clearly shows that at short horizons the private spreads’ variance is
mostly explained by sovereign spreads’ shocks, with a 70% share of contribution under the high
synchronization regime. This result holds even at longer horizons; while in normal times some
small significant effects arise only in the long run.
The above evidence is in line with the regimes’ interpretation emerging from the impulse
response analysis and suggests that sources of fiscal instability induce a nonlinear degree of
variation in sovereign interest rates; the latter, in turn, inject nonlinear financial amplification,
through private spreads.
2.5 Conclusions
The nexus between government and banking system played a key role in explaining the euro-area
sovereign debt crisis: indicators of sovereign and bank credit risk for the periphery countries
spiked together both with the global financial crisis and right after the Greek bailout in 2010.
Financial panic spread in the two markets with apparently few filters. Although this evidence
is well established in the literature, a key open question addresses the sources of the risk trans-
mission. How much of this synchronized risk surge comes from macro risk factors? and how
the emerging fragility in both markets can be reconciled with the structural regularities driving
periods of low financial stress?
We address these questions by estimating a MS-VAR on the southern EZ countries (Italy,
Portugal and Spain). We historically identify periods of high financial amplification, as opposed
to normal times. By using the information of both scenarios, the model extracts two distinct
latent sources of risk: one featuring the determination of sovereign spreads in terms of debt-
to-GDP; the other interesting the nexus between private and sovereign spreads. The former
generates regimes of high and low vulnerability of sovereign spread to fiscal imbalances. High
sovereign risk sensitiveness to debt is then channelled to the private financial markets under the
high synchronization regime, which, instead, is generated by the latter source of instability.
Chapter 3
Euro Area Fiscal Regimes:
The case of France1
3.1 Introduction
The global financial and the sovereign debt crises severely worsened the Euro area (EA) fiscal
imbalances putting renewed emphasis on whether the outstanding debt and its projected path
are consistent with short-run primary balance dynamics. Despite it’s core policy implications,
the question of short-run stabilization versus long-run sustainability is still an open debate,
both at the national and the EA level. Our aim is twofold: i) first, we evaluate the extent
to which government’s fiscal attitudes toward debt adjustments (fiscal stance) are compatible
with debt accumulation dynamics; ii) in light of the above relationship, we identify regimes of
fiscal sustainability, which occur recurrently replacing unsustainable regimes. We perform this
analysis using data evidence for France.
The degree to which fiscal policy is consistent with intertemporal solvency has been for years
the focus of a well established empirical literature, which builds on the seminal contribution of
Bohn (1998). His approach consists in defining sustainability conditions on the response of the
primary balance to debt changes: a positive and significant adjustment signals a sustainable
fiscal stance (passive fiscal policy); while a weak relationship identifies unsustainable fiscal
imbalances (active fiscal policy). Applications of Bohn’s test have initially concerned US data
(Bohn (2008)), but there are also extensions to panels of emerging and developed economies due
to Mendoza and Ostry (2008), while EU countries are treated in Melitz (2000), among others.
Results hardly find evidence of active fiscal behaviours. By estimating the rule for the primary
balance, fiscal solvency seems to be credibly guaranteed. However, as emphasized in Leeper and
Leith (2016), such analyses might produce misleading inferences about fiscal behavior, when
they do not embody the bond valuation equation. The latter is an equilibrium condition which
bring in the forward-looking nature of nominal government debt and, therefore, calls for a fully
specified DSGE framework.
1This chapter should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The
views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.
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Figure 3.1: Primary balance and debt-to-GDP dynamics. France and US
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We use the modelling environment proposed by the empirical literature on monetary and
fiscal policy regimes, by Bianchi and Ilut (2017), and we adapt it to study debt sustainability
in France. Indeed, while their model provides a successful analytical tool for the US case, the
application to the EA turns to be not trivial. Two main issues arise in the latter case: i) a proper
analysis of the monetary policy at the EA level cannot be abstracted from the consideration
of a currency union setup, where an independent central bank and a fragmented collection of
multiple fiscal authorities are crucially tied; ii) while for US debt and price dynamics seem
to be jointly determined2, independently on the fiscal stance (primary budget balance), for
France, instead, data evidence shows that we can explain debt facts already by studying fiscal
regimes on the relationship between short-run stabilization and long-run sustainability (fiscal
policy and solvency), independently on inflation dynamics. Moreover, Sims (2013) tells us that
2The US post-World War II inflation and debt facts can be interpreted through the lens of the fiscal theory;
while the post-Walker era is consistent with the traditional monetary view.
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the EA strategic environment alters and substantially weakens the degree of policy interactions,
inducing a looser link between national fiscal stances and inflationary pressures.
With the aim of studying debt determination through the lens of fiscal regimes, Figure
3.1 reports some evidence on France (top panel) and US (bottom panel), covering the period
1959-2009. It shows the evolution of the primary deficit-to-debt ratio, taken as a measure
of the country’s fiscal stance, observed jointly with the debt-to-GDP ratio, as an index of
sustainability. Some stylized facts can be already identified. First, over the first 10 years of the
sample, France was running primary surpluses compatibly with a sustainable debt; whereas,
since then, a series of primary deficits were feeding a fast and steady surge in the debt-to-GDP
ratio. The comparison with US data is rather informative and suggests a crucial difference
between the two countries’ fiscal events. In US, indeed, under the pre-Volker period a low
debt-to-GDP ratio was guaranteed by high inflation and low real interest rates, even though
the government was running primary deficits, while during the post-Volker high debt arose with
low inflation and primary surpluses. The two fiscal phenomena suggest different analyses, and
for France debt sustainability concerns seem to be closely tied to fiscal variables.
We, therefore, use a general equilibrium model, in the tradition of Lubick and Shorfeide
(2004) and Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2010), to extract an empirical narrative of debt determi-
nation and fiscal stance, using a newly-built French dataset from 1955 to 2009. Fiscal policy
regimes are introduced on the response of primary surplus to outstanding debt, thus on the
rule for tax revenues, whose parameters are controlled by a latent exogenous policy factor.
Specifically, we allow them to undertake two regimes of debt sustainability, given a monetary
policy actively targeting inflation. As a result, we focus exclusively on Ricardian equilibria, for
which the government budget constraint must be satisfied, for any path of the price level. This
assumption seems consistent with the constraints imposed by the European Monetary System
in 1979 and the EMU framework since 1999. The model is solved with Markov-switching per-
turbation methods by Maih (2015). In this framework, agents form expectations taking into
account the probabilistic distribution over future regime changes (Bianchi (2013)). Model’s per-
formance is assessed on the ability to recover stylized facts in line with the historical narratives.
Our empirical results for France identify two regions of debt sustainability, where fiscal data
evidence is the outcome of two differently specified processes for the tax rule. Specifically, a
sustainable regime covered ‘Les Trente Glorieuses’ until 1977 and then re-emerged in 1999 with
the euro membership. This is consistent with an estimated positive response of the primary
balance to outstanding debt. An unsustainable regime, instead, characterized the 1978-1998
period, years of a costly transition, where a prudent policy mix aiming at disinflation, external
balance and nominal exchange rate stability lead to primary deficits and increasing debt-to-
GDP accumulation. Over this period, taxes were approximately insensitive to long-term debt
concerns.
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature. Section 3.3 presents
the model. Section 3.4 estimates the structural model, extracts the fiscal regimes and sets the
direction for future progresses. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
This paper relates to three strands of the literature. First, we borrow from the empirical liter-
ature, which provides reduced-form and structural tests for fiscal sustainability (see D’Erasmo,
Mendoza and Zhang (2016) for an overview). Regarding the non-structural interpretations,
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2011) define regimes of policy interactions, based on the response
of future surpluses and the real value of government debt to a positive shock to surpluses. A sec-
ond branch of the correlation-based testing literature follows Bohn (1998)’s seminal work, which
defines fiscal regimes on the interpretation of the fiscal rule coefficients. If primary balances
weakly correct debt changes, fiscal behaviour is active and delivers unstable debt dynamics; if,
instead, the government is taking actions to counteract changes in debt, fiscal policy is passive
and sustainable. As discussed in Leeper and Leith (2016), however, surplus-debt estimates
which do not take into account the bond evaluation equation are subject to simultaneity bias,
producing misleading inferences about fiscal behaviour. Biases arise from the failure to model
the general equilibrium relationships between government debt and surpluses, conditions that
bring in the forward-looking nature of nominal debt valuation and the role of monetary policy.
A close inspection on this is provided by Leeper and Li (2017). Regarding the structural ap-
proach, instead, a unified theory for US inflation historical dynamics is developed by Bianchi
and Ilut (2017) and Bianchi and Melosi (2017) in a DSGE framework with a fully specified fiscal
sector, but no contributions are so far interesting the identification of Euro Area fiscal regimes.
We fill this gap with the case of France.
Our paper is also partially related to the large literature on the macroeconomic role of
fiscal and monetary policy interactions in the determination of inflation and debt dynamics.
Following the seminal contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), who developed the analysis
in a deterministic environment, various studies (Sims (1994), Woodford (1994, 1995, 2011))
focused on the determinacy properties of model’s equilibrium, placing fiscal policy in a coor-
dination game with the monetary authority. Leeper (1991) defines conditions for uniqueness
and existence of model’s solution under different combinations of policy regimes. His paper led
the way towards a vast literature studying inflation as a fiscal phenomenon (Sims (2016)), as
well as monetary. Since then, regimes of fiscal dominance, supporting the Fiscal Theory of the
Price Level (FTPL), are studied both in isolation (Cochrane (2005, 2001)) and inside a unified
framework3 of power imbalances between the two policy authorities, which studies: i) the im-
plications of fiscal imbalances on the price level; ii) how the conduct of the monetary policy
affects debt sustainability concerns. Modelling setups including price rigidity, a maturity struc-
3Two main equilibrium outcomes are generally identified. The first considers agents forming expectations
compatibly with a fiscal authority able to take adequate corrective fiscal measures to stabilize debt dynamics,
while the central bank is credibly committed to inflation. This case is generally called the monetary-led regime
(Regime M), where fiscal shocks have little effects on inflation and real activity. The second, instead, considers a
scenario where agents don’t believe in future fiscal backing, inflation expectations tend to rise, the monetary policy
accommodates. Changes in inflation and bond prices induce nominal government debt revaluations, causing a
temporary economic boom and reduction in the fiscal burden. The literature refers to this case as the fiscally-led
regime (Regime F). In both scenarios it is assumed that the monetary and fiscal authorities act in coordination,
keeping debt on a stable path and inflation controlled. However, cases of policy conflicts Bianchi and Melosi
(2017) proved to be able to explain some historically and currently relevant puzzles.
50
ture for government debt, distortionary taxes and fiscal rules for government spending widen
the scope of policy interactions, as discussed in Leeper and Leith (2016). We inherit the general
equilibrium approach from this strand of the literature, but we depart from it considering only
Ricardian equilibria, evaluating regimes of fiscal sustainability.
Finally, our paper borrows extensively also from the insights of the literature on the role of
agents’ expectations over policy regimes in generating crucial equilibrium dynamics within the
context of forward looking behaviours. Agents’ current decision rules are, indeed, affected by
the degree of credibility and enforceability of the fiscal behaviour (Sims (1982)), through what
Leeper and Zha (2003) call the ‘expectations formation effects’. Their relevance proves to be
significant both within regime and as a source of shifts over them, as various counterfactual
simulations testify. On this ground, Markov-switching DSGE models proved to provide a good
understanding of recent sensitive dynamics. For monetary policy shifts Schorfheide (2005),
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana and Rubio-Rami´ırez (2010), Liu, Waggoner and Zha
(2011) and Foerster (2015, 2016); for the fiscal and monetary policy mix Davig and Leeper (2006,
2007), Bianchi and Ilut (2017) and policy uncertainty at the ZLB Bianchi and Melosi (2017).
Applications in different settings produce extensive accounting for new and past prevailing
stylized facts, which emerge nonlinearly from historical events. Moreover, since regime-switching
models account for the role of expectations over regimes, they count on expanded regions of
equilibrium determinacy (Davig and Leeper (2007), Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2009), Ascari,
Florio and Gobbi (2017)). This feature allows the interpretation of cases of policy conflicts,
which proved to explain crucial historical puzzles. We borrow this framework to characterize
agents expectations around policymakers’ behaviour, and assess their implications in terms of
debt sustainability.
3.3 The model
Our framework builds on a basic monetary DSGE model in the tradition of Lubick and Shorfeide
(2004) and Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2010), augmented with a fiscal block, whose details are
borrowed by Bianchi and Ilut (2017).
We consider a production economy subject to nominal rigidities a` la Rotemberg (1982).
Sticky prices, indeed, provide a channel for policy interaction since they account for monetary
policy effects on debt dynamics, through real debt service costs. We introduce a maturity struc-
ture for government debt and persistence through external habits in consumption and inflation
indexation. Fiscal policy is described by rules on tax revenues and government expenditure4.
We add Markov-switching properties on the elasticities characterizing the tax rule, which are
therefore modelled as the outcome of a two-state discrete exogenous latent process. Impor-
tantly, the model is designed to capture the role of agents beliefs over regimes, property which
widens the model’s determinacy regions, creating room for understanding conditions of lack
of policy coordination. As mentioned above, indeed, the paper studies fiscal regimes of debt
4The assumption of explicit rules for fiscal instruments reflects more realistically the last stabilization measures
privileging government expenditure adjustments (Leeper, Traum and Walker (2017)).
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sustainability, given a monetary policy committed to control inflation.
3.3.1 Agents and Their Decision Problems
The structure of the economy is as follows. A representative household consumes, saves, and
supplies labor. The final output is assembled by a competitive final good producer who uses
as inputs a continuum of intermediate goods manufactured by monopolistic competitors. The
intermediate goods’ producers rent labor from the household and set prices a` la Rotemberg
(1982). Finally, the government fixes the one-period nominal interest rate, sets taxes and
decides over government expenditure. The economy is hit by seven shocks: a preference shock
on the households’ side; a technology and a cost-push shock on the supply side; and four policy
shocks (one monetary and three fiscally-driven).
Households
The representative household receives utility from consumption Ct, and disutility from labor
supply ht. Preferences are described by the following discounted flow of period utilities:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtedt
[
log(Ct − ΦC˜t−1)− ht
]}
(3.1)
Preferences, logarithmic in consumption and linear in labor, show external habits, where C˜t is a
measure of the aggregate lagged level of consumption, while Φ is the degree of habits’ formation.
The preference shock has an AR(1) representation: dt = ρddt−1 + σdεdt . The budget constraint
is given by:
PtCt + P
m
t B
m
t + P
s
t Bt = PtWtht +Bt−1 + (1 + ρP
m
t )Bt−1 + PtDt − Tt + TRt (3.2)
where Pt is the aggregate price level, Wt the real wage, Dt are the real dividends paid by firms,
Tt denotes lump-sum taxes, and finally TRt represents government transfers. Agents have access
to two kinds of government bonds, differing in maturity: Bt indicates a one-period bond in zero
net supply, while Bmt is the long period bond in non-zero net supply.
5 Bonds’ prices are given
by P st =
1
Rt
and Pmt , respectively. The price recursion for long-term bonds can be defined as
Pm−jt+j = ρ
jPmt+j , where the parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] controls the average maturity of debt. The
latter is defined as (βρ− 1)−1.
The bond-pricing equations for short and long term securities are :
1 = βEt
{
edt+1−dt
uc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
1 + ρPmt+1
Pmt
Π−1t+1
}
(3.3)
1 = βEt
{
edt+1−dt
uc(t+ 1)
uc(t)
Rt
Πt+1
}
(3.4)
5The long-term bonds are modelled as a portfolio of infinitely many bonds, with weight along the maturity
structure given by ρT−(t+1) for T > t (see Eusepi and Preston (2013) and Woodford (2011) for a detailed
explanation).
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where uc(t) = Ct − ΦC˜t−1 is the marginal utility of consumption and Πt = PtPt−1 stands for
inflation. In equation (3.3) the realized return of the maturity bond is Rmt+1 =
1+ρPmt+1
Pmt
, while
combining the two conditions we derive the no-arbitrage condition:
Rt = Et
{
Rmt+1
}
(3.5)
Finally, the labor supply condition is characterized by:
Wt = Ct − ΦC˜t−1 (3.6)
Firms
The supply side of the economy is populated by a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms producing differentiated intermediate goods, used as inputs by a perfectly competitive
firm, which combines them in a final output and sells it to households. The intermediate firms
are price takers in factors’ markets and price makers in goods’ market. They use the following
CES production function:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
1−νtdj
) 1
1−νt
(3.7)
where Yt(j) is the intermediate good produced by the j ∈ [0, 1] firm and 1νt is the time-varying
elasticity of substitution between two differentiated goods. The latter translates in a price
markup shock µt =
κ
1+ιβ log
(
1−ν
νt
)
, where κ = 1−ν
νψΠ2
; ν stands for the steady state level of vt
and Π is the steady state level of inflation. Finally, we assume that the mark-up shock evolves
according to µt = ρµµt−1 + σµε
µ
t .
Given technology, the demand for intermediate inputs is therefore the following:
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) 1
νt
Yt (3.8)
where Pt(j) is the price of the intermediate good produced by firm j. Intermediate inputs are
produced by a continuum of firms operating under monopolistic competition and endowed with
the following production technology:
Yt(j) = Atht(j)
1−α (3.9)
where labor is the only input, α ∈ (0, 1) and At is the total factor productivity evolving according
to a random walk with drift process ln(At/At−1) = γ+at with at = ρaat−1+σaεat . The parameter
γ is the growth rate of the economy6. The labor demand is given by:
Wt = ϕt(j)(1− α)Atht(j)−α (3.10)
6The presence of the growth rate γ makes the economy not stationary, and then the aggregate variable must be
de-trended in order to guarantee stationarity. Given the variable, Xt we define the respective detrended variable
Xˆt =
Xt
At
.
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where ϕt(j) is the real marginal cost. Each firm j has monopolistic power in the production of
its variety and therefore solves a pricing setting problem. To allow for a real effect of monetary
policy, we introduce nominal rigidities a` la Rotemberg (1982). Firms face a quadratic cost in
adjusting their price in the form of an output loss:
ACt(j) =
ψ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− Π
j
t−1
Πι−1
)2
Yt(j)
Pt(j)
Pt
(3.11)
where ψ determines the degree of nominal price rigidity. Moreover, indexation to lagged inflation
is controlled by the parameter ι. Each firm sets its price Pt(j) to maximize the present value
of future profits:
max
Pt(j)
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
Qt
[(
Pt(j)
Pt
)
Yt(j)−Wtht(j)−ACt(j)
]}
(3.12)
subject to equations (3.9), (3.10), (3.11) and (3.8)
where Qt is the marginal value of a unit of consumption good. Firms face all the same problem
and therefore choose the same price (Pt(j) = Pt) and produce the same quantity (Yt(j) = Yt
and ϕ(j) = ϕt). After imposing the symmetric equilibrium, the optimal price setting rule is
given by:
1
νt
[1− (1− α)ϕt] = 1− ψ
(
Πt −
Πιt−1
Πι−1
)
Πt − ψ
2
(
Πt −
Πιt−1
Πι−1
)2 νt − 1
νt
+Et
{
β
Ct − ΦC˜t−1
Ct+1 − ΦC˜t
ψ
(
Πt+1 − Π
ι
t
Πι−1
)
Πt+1
Yt+1
Yt
}
(3.13)
Finally, substituting the labor supply schedule (equation (3.6)) into the labor demand curve
(equation (3.10)) we derive the real marginal cost equation:
ϕt =
(
Ct − ΦC˜t−1
) ht
(1− α)Yt (3.14)
Government
Imposing the restriction that one-period debt is in zero net supply, policy choices must be
consistent with the government’s flow budget constraint Et+B
m
t−1(1+ρPmt )+TPt = Pmt Bmt +Tt,
where Pmt B
m
t is the market value of debt, Et represents the government expenditure, Tt stands
for tax revenues and TPt is a shock capturing residual features, such as changes in the maturity
structure and the term premium. Government expenditure is the sum of good purchases and
transfers: Et = PtGt + TRt. Rewriting the government budget constraint in terms of GDP
ratios yields:
et + b
m
t−1
Rmt
Πt
Yt−1
Yt
+ tpt = b
m
t + τt
54
where bmt =
Pmt B
m
t
PtYt
, et, tpt and τt are expressed as a fraction of GDP. The term-premia process
follows: tpt = ρtptpt−1+σtp
tp
t . We, then, assume that government expenditure has a short-term
and a long-term component: et = e
s
t + e
L
t . The latter is assumed exogenous, e
L
t = ρeLe
L
t−1 +
σeLε
eL
t , capturing large programs following political processes. The short-term component,
instead, accounts for cyclical fiscal measures and follows:
eSt = ρeSe
S
t−1 + (1− ρeS )
[
eS + φ
y,ξpolt
(
yˆt − yˆnt
)]
σeSε
eS
t (3.15)
where the term
(
yˆt − yˆnt
)
indicates the output gap, i.e the deviation of the actual output from
its natural level prevailing in the absence of nominal rigidities. We link the parameter φy to
the same Markov chain controlling switches in the tax rule. Moreover, we define the fraction of
public expenditure devoted to government goods’ purchases with χt =
PtGt
Et
, which in terms of
GDP ratios becomes:
χt =
(
Gt
Yt
)
e−1t (3.16)
where χt = ρχχt−1 + σχ
χ
t .
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is governed by a rule on the short-term nominal interest rate Rt. The central
bank obeys a Taylor-type rule, for which the nominal interest rate adjusts to deviations of both
inflation from its target and output from its natural level:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR[(Πt
Π
)ψpi( Yt
Y nt
)ψy](1−ρR)
eσRε
R
t (3.17)
where R is the steady-state for the gross nominal interest rate7 and εRt the exogenous monetary
policy shock with persistence ρR. Note that we assume that the Taylor principle (ψpi > 1) is
always satisfied.
Market Clearing
The model closes with the aggregate resource constraint given by Yt = Ct+Gt. This specification
for the market clearing condition assumes that the losses from the quadratic adjustment costs
are paid by the intermediate goods producers and transmitted to the households trough the
distributed profits. Expressing the market clearing condition in terms of gt =
1
1−Gt
Yt
8 gives:
Yt = Ct + Yt
(
1− 1
gt
)
(3.18)
7We denote all the variables in steady state without the time sub-index: for example, given the general variable
Xt the respective steady state level is indicated by X.
8This specification of the market clearing conditions simplified the log-linearized version of the model that
become y˜t = c˜t + g˜t
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3.3.2 Fiscal Policy Regimes
The fiscal authority sets tax revenues, τt, according to the following rule:
τt = ρττt−1 + ρτ
[
τ + δ
b,ξpolt
(bt − b) + δe,ξpolt (et − e) + δy,ξpolt (yt − y
n
t )
]
+ στε
τ
t (3.19)
where τ denotes the steady state of the tax-to-GDP ratio and ετt the exogenous tax shock.
The latent state variable ξpolt captures Markov-switching regimes in fiscal policy behaviour,
as described by tax changes. The same Markov chain defines the fiscal authority’s attitude
toward intertemporal debt stabilization, measured by δ
b,ξpolt
, budget balancing, measured by
the response to the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, δ
e,ξpolt
, and cyclical fluctuations, measured by the
taxes’ response to output gap, δ
y,ξpolt
. The unobserved variable ξpolt takes on two possible states
and follows a Markov chain evolving according to the transition matrix Hpol = {hi,j}i,j∈{0,1},
where hi,j indicates the probability to switch from state i to state j.
We, therefore, consider two regimes for fiscal policy making, given that the Taylor principle
for monetary policy is always satisfied in our model. We follow the convention labelling as
sustainable regime (S) the fiscal behaviour according to which taxes are set to guarantee debt
stability, namely the coefficient on debt-to-GDP is strictly greater than the real interest rate:
δb,S > β
−1 − 1. The unsustainable regime (U) reflects, instead, lack of fiscal commitment
and, thus, a weak reaction of the primary surplus to debt: δb,U < β
−1 − 1. We, therefore,
define ξpolt = {S ,U}. Furthermore, although we set the regimes’ labelling only according to
the primary adjustment to debt, the latter is defined together with switches in the other fiscal
rule’s parameters, namely the one on expenditure, δ
e,ξpolt
, and the output gap, δ
y,ξpolt
. It is
worth clarifying that we can solve the model under both the sustainable and the unsustainable
regime, given an active monetary policy, thanks to the extended determinacy properties of
the equilibrium, guaranteed by the Markov-switching framework. Indeed, this modelling setup
assumes that agents form expectations taking into account the possibility of future changes in
policymakers’ behaviour. This feature widens the equilibrium determinacy regions.
3.3.3 Solution and Estimation methods
Since the technology process At exhibits trend growth, the model is rescaled before being lin-
earized around the unique deterministic steady state. Indeed, the policy regimes enter only on
variables expressed as deviations from steady states. We solve the model using the efficient
perturbation methods applied to Markov-switching models elaborated by Maih (2015), and dif-
ferently proposed also by Foerster et al. (2016)9. A detailed description of the solution method
is reported in Appendix C.3. The model’s first-order approximated solution can be written in
9They differ in the fixed point around which they perform the Taylor series expansion. Foerster et al. (2016)
expand around the steady state associated to the ergodic mean of the parameters. The approach pioneered by
Maih (2015), instead, expands around the steady state associated to each regime taken in isolation. In our case,
the regimes do not alter the steady state. Therefore, the two approaches would not differ.
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the following form:
Υt = Tξpolt
(Υt−1, σ, t) (3.20)
T
ξpolt
= T
ξpolt
(z) +DT
ξpolt
(z)(zt − z)
where Υt is the vector of model’s variables, Tξpolt
the Taylor first-order expansion, σ defines
the perturbation parameter, t the vector of structural shocks and DT the matrix of first-order
derivatives. The expansion point is z
ξpolt
= (Υ, 0, 0), where zt = (Υt−1, σ, t) and Υ identifies
the variables’ steady states. The law of motion (3.3.3) is combined with a system of observation
equations to build a state space system. The model is estimated with Bayesian methods. The
likelihood is computed with a variant of the Kim filter10, originally proposed by Kim and
Nelson (1999). The states’ probabilities are, instead, extracted using the Hamilton (1994)
filter. The obtained likelihood is, then, combined with a prior distribution for the parameters,
thereby forming the posterior kernel. We first find the posterior modes, and then use them as
starting points to initialize the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm11 to sample from the posterior
distribution. After running the MH algorithm, we perform diagnostics to ensure convergence
of the MCMC chain.
3.4 Debt Sustainability Regimes
The model is estimated using seven data series for France, collected at annual frequency, span-
ning the sample 1955-2009. They include: the real GDP growth, GDP deflator inflation, the
short term interest rate and four fiscal variables, expressed as GDP ratios: government debt,
current tax revenues, government expenditure and a transformation of government purchases.
Appendix C.4 provides a detailed description of the data used and their mapping in the model.
We calibrate the discount factor β to 0.9832, which implies an annual 2% percent real
interest rate. We set the labor share at 66%, α = 0.33, and the average maturity to 5 years,
implying ρ = 0.8137. Moreover, in order to separate the short from the long term component
of government expenditure, we fix ρeL = 0.9606, annual equivalent of a quarterly 0.99, and
σeL = .1%. The Taylor rule is entirely calibrated, given the substantial misspecification coming
from using country level data to describe a monetary policy lead by different types of external
factors (ERM since 1979 and EMU since 1999). We, therefore, fix ψpi = 1.5, ψy = 0.5 and
ρR = 0.7, coherently with the estimates by Jondeau and Sahuc (2008) for France. In accordance
with them, we also fix the price indexation at ι = 0.35, because poorly identified. Weak
identification induces to calibrate also the preference and tax shocks’ persistence parameters at
ρτ = 0.7 and ρd = 0.7.
10In the regime switching case, the Kalman filter cannot be used because the shocks’ distributions are no longer
Gaussian, being a mixture of Gaussians. Furthermore, they depend on the entire history of regimes. The exact
distributions cannot be recovered, but by truncating the mixture to contain only the Gaussians associated to few
regimes, the likelihood can be approximated. This is the Kim filter.
11We generate 2 chains, each consisting of 100,000 draws (1 every 10 draws is saved), with a burn-in period of
15% of them. The scale parameter is set to obtain an acceptance rate of around 35%.
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Table 3.1: Posterior Modes, Means, 90% Error Bands and Priors of the Model Parameters
Posterior Prior
Mode Mean 5% 95% Type Mean Std. Dev
δb(S) 0.04462 0.04507 0.03508 0.05432 N 0 0.5
δb(U) 0.01226 0.00739 -0.00609 0.02079 N 0 0.5
δe(S) 0.84994 0.80286 0.35805 1.24552 N 1 0.5
δe(U) 1.37539 1.61890 1.09759 2.12823 N 1 0.5
δy(S) 0.33789 0.35438 0.01920 0.69052 N 0 0.5
δy(U) -0.01237 0.09734 -0.32669 0.52676 N 0 0.5
φy(S) -0.73815 -0.80143 -0.99314 -0.64234 N -0.5 0.5
φy(U) -0.75982 -0.80142 -1.02243 -0.61425 N -0.5 0.5
HpolSU 0.02638 0.03635 0.00710 0.07979 Dir 0.3 0.2
HpolUS 0.08144 0.09615 0.03487 0.17605 Dir 0.3 0.2
ρχ 0.98301 0.98458 0.97122 0.99458 B 0.5 0.2
ρeS 0.41307 0.44134 0.33740 0.54536 B 0.4 0.1
ρtp 0.56841 0.53987 0.38636 0.68847 B 0.5 0.2
ρµ 0.75150 0.72426 0.61539 0.82700 B 0.5 0.2
ρa 0.32519 0.34957 0.11537 0.59417 B 0.4 0.2
Φ 0.75313 0.72375 0.64224 0.79804 B 0.5 0.1
κ 0.01372 0.01607 0.00186 0.03407 G 0.2 0.2
exp(γ) 1.03429 1.03145 1.02382 1.03884 N 1.03 0.3
B 0.68295 0.75170 0.54646 0.96328 N 0.6 0.5
G 1.14811 1.15001 1.13799 1.16225 N 1.15 0.01
T 0.19182 0.20062 0.18475 0.21581 N 0.27 0.1
ln(P ) 0.03688 0.04030 0.01940 0.05922 N 0.064 0.1
σR 0.01861 0.01967 0.01717 0.02246 IG 0.01 5
σχ 0.03634 0.03442 0.02951 0.03990 IG 0.01 5
στ 0.00554 0.00580 0.00499 0.00670 IG 0.005 5
σeS 0.00329 0.00360 0.00266 0.00457 IG 0.005 5
σtp 0.08096 0.08675 0.07576 0.09901 IG 0.01 5
σa 0.02735 0.02891 0.01950 0.03962 IG 0.05 5
σd 0.22102 0.20474 0.16145 0.25342 IG 0.1 5
σµ 0.00345 0.00391 0.00257 0.00544 IG 0.01 5
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Priors’ specification and posterior estimates are reported in Table 3.1. The priors for the
constant parameters are in line with previous contributions in the literature; while regarding
those interesting the regime-switching parameters, they are symmetric across regimes and as-
sumed very loose. In addition, the priors for the steady state ratios of government spending,
debt and taxes to output are centred at their respective first data moments. The first panel of
the Table shows results for the parameters interested by regime-switching properties. Indeed,
each parameter of the fiscal rule assumes two distinct values, whether in regime S or in U. Under
the sustainable regime, as defined in Section 3.4, taxes react to debt according to a positive
coefficient, which turns to be larger than the threshold value used to identify a passive fiscal
behaviour (β−1 − 1 = 0.0171); while under the unsustainable regime the response is very weak,
approximately close to zero. At the same time, however, the parameters controlling how taxes
are set over expenditure and output gap changes display distinct dynamics over regimes: the
U regime is associated with lower prociclicality (δy) and higher elasticity within the budget
balance (δe). Both regimes are quite persistent, but when the system is in U the probability
to switch back to S is higher, implying that S is more recurrent and persistent than U. The
estimated transition matrix is not only informative regarding the realized regime sequence, but
also on how model dynamics induce changes across regimes.
Figure 3.2: Unsustainable Fiscal Regime. Probabilities at the posterior mode
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With the aim of linking regime changes to historical accounts of the French fiscal policy,
Figure 3.2 plots the smoothed probabilities assigned to the unsustainable regime U, as defined
in Section 3.4 and whose parameters are estimated in Table 3.1. The complementary area
characterizes the sustainable regime S, which, as a first phase, marks Les Trente Glorieuses
(from 1945 to 1975), as coined by Fourastie´ (1979). Those were years of steady economic
and industrial development, policies of economic dirigisme were supporting entire key sectors,
several devaluations (1958,1969) were boosting growth favouring competitiveness, and high in-
flation was overheating the economy. At the same time, primary surpluses and low levels of the
debt-to-GDP ratio provided the fiscal space for sustainability. However, since 1977 policies of
disinflation, external balance and nominal exchange rate stability (Plan Barre (1976), compli-
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ance to ERM (1979) and Mitterand’s Tournant de la rigeur) set the bases of major rethinking
of French economic policy, which lead to the generation of primary deficits, together with a
debt-to-GDP ratio at the first steps of a steady surge, as also shown in Figure 3.1. Consistently,
under regime U, the red area in Figure 3.2, our estimates report no fiscal commitment towards
debt, but high sensitivity to expenditure. Evidently, this fiscal behaviour turned in negative
budget balances and uncontrolled debt accounts. This motivates even more the definition of
the resulting regime as unsustainable for French public finances. Moreover, on this regard, even
if our analysis is not informative on the monetary-fiscal interactions, thinking of nominal debt
revaluations driven by inflation is quite hard for those years. Indeed, with the exception of the
last 1970s, since 1983, inflation in France experienced a clear-cut decline, which evidently rules
out the hypothesis of a passive monetary policy sustaining debt. Finally, the model predicts also
the occurrence of a subsequent gradual switch back to the sustainable regime, transition which
started in 1999 with the euro membership. The latter evidence is in line with the findings of
Gomes and Seoane (2018), while in contrast with Welchenrleder and Zimmer (2014). However,
a full investigation on the dynamics in place at the euro area aggregate level would require a
different framework.
3.4.1 Way forward
Our results rely on a framework where fiscal regimes are extracted on the tax rule of a stan-
dard New Keynesian DSGE model. It is worth remarking here that the literature is pretty
exhaustive on the theoretical side, but empirically structural investigations covered mainly the
US narrative. At the Euro Area level, instead, the field is still unexplored, given the set of
additional challenges which the EMU scenario and country-level heterogeneities would entail.
Our contribution represents a first attempt to extract stylized facts by looking at the fiscal side
of the French historical dynamics. Although this is already a contribution per se`, our approach
is to bring our results forward to further layers of exploration, and we are willing to do so based
on the limitations that our analysis encounters from different perspectives. First, among our
results we don’t report policy simulations because our assumption of lamp-sum taxes implies
no differences on the real effects of fiscal shocks across regimes. In order to solve this point in
our single-country framework, the introduction of distortionary taxation would be a compelling
addition to interpret how model dynamics are affected by fiscal regimes. Furthermore and more
importantly, a critical issue of our approach arises from the assumption of no regimes’ interac-
tions between the fiscal and the monetary policy authorities. We, indeed, work with a model
where the Taylor principle is always satisfied and this implies that: i) inflation is always under
the control of the monetary policy; ii) any inflationary-induced debt revaluations are not taken
into account; iii) fiscal backing is always guaranteed; iv) fiscal regimes do not translate into
regime-specific real effects, under lamp-sum taxation. Although we argue that this setup could
approximate the macro framework starting by 1979 with the ERM pegged system and then by
1999 with the EMU, a full narrative on EA fiscal regimes would require building a multi-country
model, where monetary policy is conducted by a central authority, the ECB. Once the monetary
policy is appropriately described, a further extension, then, could account for the ELB on the
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more recent macro evidence.
3.5 Conclusions
Fiscal imbalances at the EA level are broadly perceived as a major source of aggregate risk and
uncertainty. Within this environment, we address the question of French debt sustainability
using an historical approach, which maps short-run primary fiscal measures to long-run solvency
over the period 1955-2009. The analysis is conducted estimating a DSGE model with Markov-
switching dynamics driving the specification of two different fiscal rules for tax revenues. The
latter are considered as interacting with each other thorough their effects on agents’ expecta-
tions, since agents are assumed to know the probability distribution of future policy changes.
Two fiscal regimes are identified on the tax rule estimates. A sustainable regime describes the
fiscal evidence of low debt and primary surpluses prevailing up to 1977, when a sudden switch
reverts the system to an unsustainable regime accounting for primary deficits and unstable debt
dynamics. In 1999, then, with the euro membership, a gradual transition to the sustainable
region is observed.
Our analysis intervenes on a field, which is still largely unexplored in the macro literature.
The EA policy debate still cannot rely on a structural assessment of fiscal events under an
empirically founded historical account. Our contribution provides evidence at a country level,
based only on fiscal policy regimes. However, a proper accounting of the EA monetary frame-
work would be necessary to evaluate policy mix interactions and their role in price and debt
determination.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 GMM Estimation of the Ambiguity Parameter
In this section we detail the derivations needed to achieve the moment condition that is the
object of our estimation. Further below we also provide a description of the dataset used in the
estimation.
A.1.1 General Approach
We use a GMM estimation procedure based on the moment condition obtained from the com-
bined Euler equation for debt and risky assets and is a variant of the techniques developed for
asset pricing models with recursive preferences, pioneered by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Kreps
and Porteus (1978). Hence the starting point is to reformulate our value function, capturing
multiplier preferences, in terms of an ambiguity term. The latter is achieved by mapping the
multiplier preferences to a special case of the recursive preferences. This can be done by assum-
ing a logarithmic continuation value, a logarithmic utility function and an exponential ambiguity
adjustment factor, Q which accounts for waves of optimism. Indeed we depart from the well-
known equivalence between multiplier and recursive preferences by embedding state-contingent
ambiguity attitudes. We start by reporting the value function derived after substituting the
solution of the inner problem, presented in Section 1.3.3:
Vt = u(ct)− βθtlog
[
Et
{
exp
(
−Vt+1
θt
)}]
(A.1)
The above equation embeds a logarithmic ambiguity-adjusted component Qt(Vt+1), which
maps future continuation values into current realizations. Indeed we can re-write (A.2) as
follows:
Vt =u(ct) + βh
−1Et {h(Vt+1)}
u(ct) + βQt(Vt+1) (A.2)
The equivalence between specifications under recursive and multiplier preferences is achieved
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by assuming the following functional form h(V ) (Hansen et al. (2007)): h(Vt+1) =
(
−Vt+1θt
)
.
The latter implies that the exponential ambiguity adjustment component reads as follows:
Qt(Vt+1) = h
−1Et {h(Vt+1)} = −θt log
[
Et
{
exp
(
−Vt+1
θt
)}]
(A.3)
A.1.2 Pricing Kernel-SDF
The next step to obtain our moment condition is to derive an expression for the stochastic
discount factor as function of the Qt(Vt+1). To this purpose, we shall derive expressions for the
marginal utilities in period t and t+1. Given the needed functional forms detailed above, namely
a logarithmic utility function u(ct) = log(ct), the marginal utility of consumption simplifies to
MCt = c
−1
t . The marginal utility of next-period continuation value is instead derived as follows:
MVt+1 =
∂Vt
∂Qt(Vt+1)
∂Qt(Vt+1)
∂Vt+1
= β
exp(−Vt+1θt )
Et
{
exp(−Vt+1θt )
} (A.4)
= β exp
(
− 1
θt
(Vt+1 −Qt(Vt+1))
)
Using the above expressions for the marginal utility we can derive the SDF as function of
the Qt factor:
Λt,t+1 =
MVt+1MCt+1
MCt
= β
ct+1
ct
−1
exp
(
− 1
θt
(Vt+1 −Qt(Vt+1))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
mt+1
(A.5)
where mt+1 = exp
(
− 1θt (Vt+1 −Qt(Vt+1))
)
is the optimal likelihood ratio. Equation (A.5)
shows that the SDF has a two-factor structure. The first factor is the standard fundamental
consumption growth, while the second is the added ambiguity factor, which is conditioned to
the distance between the future value function and its certainty equivalent (the future insurance
premium). Under no uncertainty this premium vanishes1.
A.1.3 Estimation of the Continuation Value Ratio
Since estimation requires strictly stationary variables, we shall re-scale the value function (A.2)
by consumption (see Hansen, Heaton and Li (2008) (HHL henceforth). We take log deviations
from the log of consumption, c˜t = log(ct), where the tilde indicates logarithms:
v˜t = βQt(v˜t+1 + ∆c˜t+1) (A.6)
We define v˜t as the log value of continuation value ratio,
Vt
ct
. Next using (A.3) into (A.6) we
1Indeed the continuation value would be perfectly predictable
(
exp
(
−Vt+1
θ
)
= Et exp
(
−Vt+1
θ
)
,m∗t+1 = 1
)
with zero adjustment (Qt(Vt+1) = Vt+1).
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obtain:
v˜t = −βθt log(Et {exp [σt(v˜t+1 + ∆c˜t+1)]}) (A.7)
where σt = −1/θt, and it is negative when θt > 0 and positive when θt < 0. We rely on
this expression when we guess a process for v˜t, which we then estimate. Indeed, since the
continuation value ratio is a function of state variables governing the dynamic behaviour of
consumption growth, we start by assuming that the latter is a function of state, ξt, which in
turn evolves according to the following first-order Markov process:
gct+1 = c˜t+1 − c˜t = µc +Hξt + At+1 (A.8)
ξt+1 = Fξt + Bt+1 (A.9)
where t+1 is a (2x1) i.i.d. vector with zero mean and covariance matrix I. A and B are (2x1)
vectors. The exogenous states, t+1, which could capture income shocks, have both a direct
impact on consumption and an indirect one through the endogenous state, ξt. The latter can
indeed capture endogenous movements in wealth which affect consumption one period later. The
estimated value of the endogenous states, ξˆt, is obtained through Kalman filtering consumption
data. The value function depends upon the estimated endogenous states, ξˆt, and consumption
growth, gct+1. Since the latter also depends upon the endogenous states, we can guess the
continuation value ratio as follows:
v˜t = µv + Uv ξˆt (A.10)
where Uv ξˆt is the discounted sum of expected future growth rates of consumption. After some
derivations we can write Uv and µv as follows:
Uv ≡ β(I − βF )−1H (A.11)
µv ≡ β
1− β
(
µc +
σt
2
|A+ UvB|2
)
where the term A+ UvB captures the dependence between the the continuation value and the
exogenous shocks.
A.1.4 SDF and the Euler Equation
Next, given the estimated v˜t from (A.10). Substituting (A.7) into (A.5) delivers:
Λt,t+1 = β
(
ct+1
ct
)−1 exp(Vt+1ct+1 ) ct+1ct
exp(Qt
(
Vt+1
ct+1
+ ∆c˜t+1
)
)
σ (A.12)
Note that equation (A.12) is equivalent to the SDF obtained under Epstein and Zin (1989)
preferences and given the assumption of unitary EIS. At last, we substitute the above SDF into
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the combined Euler for debt and risky asset (1.15) and (1.16), which results in:
Et

β
(
ct+1
ct
)(1−σ) exp Vt+1ct+1
β
√
exp Vtct
σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λt,t+1
(
Rst+1 − φRt+1
)
+ φ− 1

= 0 (A.13)
where Rst+1 =
dt+1+qt+1
qt
and for the estimation we shall write the debt rate as time-varying.
A.2 Analytical Derivations
This appendix derives analytical expressions for asset prices and returns.
A.2.1 Asset Price
From the borrowers’ optimality condition on risky assets:
qt =βEt
{
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
mt+1(qt+1 + dt+1)
}
+ φµ
′
tqt (A.14)
=βEt{Λt,t+1(dt+1 + qt+1)}+ φµ′tqt
using the definitions for Λt,t+1 = β
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
mt+1 and µ
′
t =
µt
uc(ct)
. Then denoting Kt,t+1 =
Λt,t+1
1−φµ′t
, we derive the following expression for the asset price:
qt = Et{Kt,t+1(dt+1 + qt+1)} (A.15)
Proceeding by forward recursion:
qt =Et{Kt,t+1(dt+1 +Kt+1,t+2(dt+2 + qt+2))} (A.16)
=Et{Kt,t+1(dt+1 +Kt+1,t+2dt+2)}+ Et{Kt,t+1Kt+1,t+2Kt+2,t+3(dt+3 + qt+3)}
=Et{Kt,t+1(dt+1 +Kt+1,t+2dt+2 +Kt+1,t+2Kt+2,t+3dt+3)}+
+ Et{Kt,t+1Kt+1,t+2Kt+2,t+3Kt+3,t+4(dt+4 + qt+4)}
=Et{Kt,t+1(dt+1 +Kt+1,t+2dt+2+
+Kt+1,t+2Kt+2,t+3dt+3 +Kt+1,t+2Kt+2,t+3Kt+3,t+4dt+4)}+
+ Et{Kt,t+1Kt+1,t+2Kt+2,t+3Kt+3,t+4qt+4}
At the final recursion step, the solution for the asset price:
qt = Et

T∑
i=1
dt+i
i∏
j=1
Kt+j−1,t+j
+ Et
{
T∏
i=0
Kt+i,t+i+1qt+T
}
(A.17)
Taking the limit for T →∞ of the above condition delivers equation (1.26).
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A.2.2 The Risk Premium
Expanding the borrower’s FOC for the risky asset and plugging in it the derivation for Et{Λt,t+1}
and the definition Rst+1 =
qt+1+dt+1
qt
we get:
1 = Et{Λt,t+1 qt+1 + dt+1
qt
}+ φµ′t (A.18)
= Et{Λt,t+1}Et
{qt+1 + dt+1
qt
}
+ Cov
(
Λt,t+1,
qt+1 + dt+1
qt
)
+ φµ′t
=
(1− µ′t
R
)
Et{Rst+1}+ Cov(Λt,t+1, Rst+1) + φµ′t
The return on risky assets is obtained:
Et{Rst+1} =
R(1− cov(Λt,t+1, Rst+1)− φµ
′
t)
1− µ′t
(A.19)
Dividing by the risk-free return rate, the premium between the return on the risky asset
and the risk-free rate can be derived:
Ψt =
1− cov(Λt,t+1, Rst+1)− φµ
′
t
1− µ′t
. (A.20)
A.2.3 The Sharpe Ratio and the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) Bounds
Writing down the two borrowers’ optimal conditions for the risk-free and risky assets, respec-
tively:
1 = Et{Λt,t+1R}+ µ′t (A.21)
1 = Et{Λt,t+1Rst+1}+ φµ
′
t (A.22)
where µ
′
t =
µt
uc(ct)
, Λt,t+1 = β
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
mt+1 and R
s
t+1 =
qt+1+dt+1
qt
. In order to derive the excess
return between the risky asset and the risk-free asset, we subtract (A.21) from (A.22), obtaining:
0 = Et{Λt,t+1(Rst+1 −R)}+ µ
′
t(φ− 1). (A.23)
Then, we define the excess return as zt+1 = R
s
t+1 − R. Assuming a linear general form for
the stochastic discount factor Λt.,t+1:
Λ∗t.,t+1 = Λ¯
∗ + β˜m(zt+1 − Etzt+1) (A.24)
it must satisfy the following condition:
0 = Et{Λ∗t,t+1zt+1}+ µ
′
t(φ− 1)}, (A.25)
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which, once expanded, gives:
0 = Et{Λ∗t,t+1}Et{zt+1}+ cov(Λ∗t,t+1, zt+1) + µ
′
t(φ− 1) (A.26)
= Et{Λ∗t,t+1}Et{zt+1}+ Et{(zt+1 − z¯)(Λ∗t,t+1 − Λ¯∗)}+ µ
′
t(φ− 1)
= Et{Λ∗t,t+1}Et{zt+1}+ Et{(zt+1 − z¯)(zt+1 − z¯)β˜m}+ µ
′
t(φ− 1)
= Et{Λ∗t,t+1}Et{zt+1}+ σ2z β˜m + µ
′
t(φ− 1).
Hence:
β˜m = −(σ2z)−1Et{Λ∗t,t+1}Et{zt+1} − (σ2z)−1µ
′
t(φ− 1) (A.27)
The variance of the stochastic discount factor is then obtained:
V ar(Λ∗t,t+1) = V ar((zt+1 − Et{zt+1})′β˜m) (A.28)
= ˜β′mσ2z β˜
m
= (−(σ2z)−1Λ¯∗tE{zt+1} − (σ2z)−1µ
′
t(φ− 1))
′
σ2z
(−(σ2z)−1Λ¯∗tE{zt+1} − (σ2z)−1µ
′
t(φ− 1))
= (σ2z)
−1(Λ¯∗)2(Et{zt+1})2+
+ 2µ
′
t(φ− 1)((σ2z)−1Λ¯∗tE{zt+1}+ ((σ2z)−1(µ
′
t)
2(φ− 1)2.
Hence:
σ2Λ∗t
Λ¯∗2
=
(Et{zt+1})2
σ2z
+ 2µ
′
t
(φ− 1)Et{zt+1}
σ2z
+
µ
′2
t
Λ∗2
(φ− 1)2
σ2z
. (A.29)
The Sharpe Ratio (SR hereafter) on stock asset returns over bonds results to be:
SR =
(Et{zt+1})2
σ2z
=
σ2Λ∗t
Λ¯∗2
− 2µ′t
(φ− 1)Et{zt+1}
σ2z
− µ
′2
t
Λ∗2
(φ− 1)2
σ2z
(A.30)
Thus, the SR depends on the variance of the adjusted for distorted beliefs stochastic discount
factor and on µ
′
t.
A.3 Numerical Method
Our numerical method extends the algorithm of Jeanne and Korinek (2010) to persistent shocks
and state-contingent ambiguity attitudes. The method, following the endogenous grid points
approach of Carroll (2006), performs backwards time iteration on the agent’s optimality condi-
tions. We derive the set of policy functions {c(b, s), b′(b, s), q(b, s), µ(b, s), V (b, s)} that solve
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competitive equilibrium characterized by the system:
c(b, s)−γ = βR E
{
m(b′, s′)c(b′, s′−γ)
}
+ µ(b, s) (A.31)
q(b, s) = β
E {m(b′, s′)c(b′, s′−γ [q(b′, s′) + αy′]}
c(b, s)−γ − φµ(b, s) (A.32)
µ(b, s)
[
b′(b, s)
R
+ φq(b, s)
]
= 0 (A.33)
c(b, s) +
b′(b, s)
R
= y + b (A.34)
V (b, s) =
c(b, s)1−γ − 1
1− γ +
β
σ
lnE
{
exp{σV (b′, y′)}} (A.35)
where m(b, s) is the expectation distortion increment. The solution method works over the
following steps:
1. We set a grid Gb = {b1, b2, . . . , bH} for the next-period bond holding b′; and a grid
Gs = {s1, s2, . . . , sN} for the shock state space s = {y, σ}. The income process y, is
discretized with Tauchen and Hussey (1991) method, while the grid for the inverse of the
penalty parameter σ (recall that θ is the inverse of σ) follows a simple two-state rule:2
σ =
σ− if V < E {V }σ+ if V ≥ E {V } (A.36)
2. In iteration step k, we start with a set of policy functions ck(b, s), qk(b, s), µk(b, s) and
Vk(b, s). For each b
′ ∈ Gb and s′ ∈ Gs:
a) we derive the expectation distortion increment:
mk(b
′, s′) =
exp{σVk(b′, s′)}
E [exp{σVk(b′, s′)}] (A.37)
and then, the distorted expectations in the Euler equation for bonds and for the risky
assets (equations (1) and (2)).
b) we solve the system of optimality conditions under the assumption that the collateral
constraint is slack:
µu(b′, s) = 0 (A.38)
As a result, cu(b′, s), qu(b′, s), µu(b′, s), V u(b′, s) and bu(b′, s) are the policy functions
for the unconstrained region;
c) in the same way, we solve the system for the constrained region of the state space,
where the following condition holds:
qc(b′, s) = −b
′/R
φ
(A.39)
2We use 800 grids point for bonds and 45 grid points for the exogenous shocks; we implement linea interpolation
in order to approximate the policy functions outside the grids
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cc(b′, s), qc(b′, s), µc(b′, s), V c(b′, s) and bc(b′, s) are the respective policy functions.
d) we derive the next period bond holding threshold b¯′ such that the borrowing con-
straint is marginally binding. For each s ∈ Gs it satisfies the following condition:
b¯′c(b¯′, s) +
b¯′(s)
R
= 0 (A.40)
When this point is out of the grid we use linear interpolation. Given this value, we
can derive for each policy function the frontier between the binding and non-binding
region: xu(b¯′c(b¯′, s) for x = {c, b, q, µ, V }.
3. In order to construct the step k+1 policy function, xk+1(b, s), we interpolate on the pairs
(xc(b′c(b′, s)) in the constraint region, and on the pairs (xu(b′u(b′, s)) in the unconstrained
region. As a result we find: ck+1(b, s), qk+1(b, s), µk+1(b, s) and Vk+1(b, s)
4. We evaluate convergence. If
sup ||xk+1 − xk|| <  for x = c, q, µ, V (A.41)
we find the competitive equilibrium. Otherwise, we set xk(b, s) = (1 − δ)xk+1(b, s) +
δxk(b, s) and continue the iterations from point 2. We use a value of δ close to 1.
A.4 Data Description for Empirical Moments
In this section we describe the data employed for the computation of the empirical moments
used for model matching. We compute several moments for asset prices, returns and debt data.
Data are from the US. The used sample spans 1980:Q1 to 2016:Q4, since this corresponds to
the period of rapid debt growth The dataset is composed as follows: debt is given by private
non-financial sector, by all sectors (BIS: http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1403g.pdf);
consumption is given by Personal Consumption Expenditure (NIPA Tables3), GDP (NIPA
Tables); the risk-free rate is the 3month T-bill rate (CRSP Indices database4); risky returns
are proxied by the S&P500 equity return with dividends (Shiller Database5). All variables are
deflated by CPI index. Note that HP-filtered series are computed as deviations from a long-term
trend. Therefore, we work with a much larger smoothing parameter (λ = 400, 000) than the
one employed in the business cycle literature, to pick up the higher expected duration of the
credit cycle (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs187.pdf).
A.5 Policy Functions
Figure A.1 shows the policy functions ct(b, y), qt(b, y), bt+1(b, y) and µt(b, y) for a medium income
shock realization. It proves that our model, even with state contingent ambiguity attitudes, is
3See https://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm.
4See http://www.crsp.com/products/research-products/crsp-historical-indexes.
5See http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
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Figure A.1: Policy Functions
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able to reproduce all the salient characteristics of the financial crises models (see Jeanne and
Korinek (2010)). Indeed, in the binding region the next period bond holding is downward
sloping and the policy functions for consumption and asset price display a higher inclination
than in the unconstrained region. The latter feature implies that in the constrained region
variables respond very strongly to changes in the current wealth, as the financial amplification
theory states.
A.6 Three Period Model
In this section we outline an extended version of the three period model with occasionally
binding collateral constraints and with ambiguity attitudes. The goal is to show the combined
effect of those two elements on debt growth. The economy we consider is populated by a
continuum of agents, who live for three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. Preferences are given by the
following specification:
U = u(c0) + ES
[
βu(c1) + β
2u(c2)
]
(A.42)
where u(c) = 12 [c¯ − c]2. In period 0 we can assume a linear utility function u(c0) = c0 in
order to simplify the analysis. We also assume that βR = 1. The endowment structure is
characterized as follows. Agents receive endowment income in period 1 and 2, but none in
period 0. In period 1 the endowment is stochastic depending on the realization of the state
s ∈ S. We assume that S = {s1, s2, ...sN} is a monotone increasing sequence. The realization
of the endowment are affected monotonically from the realization of s, so that for example
ysn > ysn−1 . The probability that a state s occurs is given by pis. Similarly to the main text we
assume that the dividend is lead by the same source of volatility. This allows us to simplify the
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state space. Therefore, in each period a fraction (1−α)yt is the labor income, and the fraction
dt = αyt is the dividends’ income. The budget constraints for each period reads as follows:
c0 + q0x0 +
b0
R
= 0 (A.43)
cs1 + q
s
1x
s
1 +
bs1
R
= (1− α)ys1 + x0(qs1 + αys1) + b0 (A.44)
cs2 = (1− α)y2 + x1αy2 + bs1 (A.45)
Note that the sup-index s in period 1 indicates that uncertainty materializes in this period.
We have assumed that b−1 = b2 = 0, x−1 = x2 = 0, q2 = 0 and d−1 = 0. In period 1 the
collateral constraint limits the amount of debt:
− b
s
1
R
≤ φqs1xs1 (A.46)
The agents expectation formation process is derived as in the main text. Since uncertainty
refers to period 1 income, agents form expectation in period 0. Their optimal likelihood ratio
in period 0 is given by:
ms1 =
exp{σ0V s1 }
E0 {exp{σ0V s1 }}
(A.47)
where the value function recursion is defined as following6: V s1 = u(c
s
1)+βu(c
s
2). The relation
that links the level of ms1 to the state of the economy is:
if V s1 < E0 {V s1 } then ms1 > 1 (A.48)
Given the above optimization problems the decentralized equilibrium is characterized as
follows. The bonds’ Euler equations between periods 0 and 1 and between periods 1 and 2, read
as follows:
1 = βRE0 {ms1uc(cs1)} (A.49)
uc(c
s
1) = βRuc(c
s
2) + µ
s
1 (A.50)
The Euler conditions on the risky asset between periods 0 and 1 and between periods 1 and
2 read as follows:
q0 = βE0 {ms1uc(cs1)[qs1 + αys1]} (A.51)
qs1 = β
uc(c
s
2)αy2
uc(cs1)− φµs1
(A.52)
The complementarity slackness condition is:
µs1
[
bs1
R
+ φqs1
]
= 0 (A.53)
6This simplified representation is obtained under the assumption that there is no uncertainty in period 2.
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Finally, the decentralized equilibrium is closed with a condition on expectations, equation
(1.7), and the following market clearing conditions:
c0 + q0 +
b0
R
= 0 (A.54)
cs1 +
bs1
R
= ys1 + b0 (A.55)
cs2 = y2 + b
s
1 (A.56)
where we have imposed the stock market clearing condition xt = 1.
A.6.1 Time 1 Continuation Equilibrium
We now proceed to the model solution by backward induction. We start from period the
last period and since there is no uncertainty between time 1 and time 2 we can solve for the
two periods simultaneously. We start from characterizing the continuation value under the
unconstrained region. The system of equilibrium conditions for the unconstrained region (the
sup-index U will be used since now on to indicate the solution for this region) is (we can use
β = R−1 and µ1 = 0):
uc(c
s
1) = uc(c
s
2) c
s
1 = c
s
2 = c
U,s (A.57)
qs1 = β
uc(c
s
2)
uc(cs1)
αy2 (A.58)
cs1 +
bs1
R
= ys1 + b0 (A.59)
cs2 = y2 + b
s
1 (A.60)
Given the above the consumption function depends on lifetime wealth and reads as follows:
cU,s =
1
1 + β
(
ys1 + b0 +
y2
R
)
(A.61)
Using the budget constraint and the consumption function one can derive the optimal level
of debt:
bU1 (s) =
β
1 + β
(
y1(s) + b0 − y2
R
)
(A.62)
Finally, the equilibrium asset price condition, which depends on the value of the dividend
in the last period, reads as follows:
q1 = βαy2 (A.63)
In the constrained region (µt > 0, the sup-index C is used since now onward to indicate
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equilibrium values for this region)), the system of equilibrium conditions reads as follows:
µs1 = uc(c
s
1)− uc(cs2) cs1 < cs2 (A.64)
qs1 = β
uc(c
s
2)
uc(cs1)− φµs1
αy2 (A.65)
cs1 +
bs1
R
= ys1 + b0 (A.66)
cs2 = y2 + b
s
1 (A.67)
bs1
R
= −φqs1 (A.68)
A.6.2 Time Zero Equilibrium
To characterize the time 0 equilibrium we first partition the state space into two blocks, SC
and SU , where the constraint is binding and slack respectively. Assuming that the u(c0) = c0
we have:
1 =
∑
s∈SU
pism
U,s
1 u
U,s
c (b0; y1, y2)) +
∑
s∈SC
pism
C,s
1 u
C,s
c (b0; y1, y2)) (A.69)
q0 = β
{ ∑
s∈SU pism
U,s
1 u
U,s
c (b0; y1, y2))[q
U
1 + y
s
1]
+
∑
s∈SC pism
C,s
1 u
C,s
c (b0; y1, y2))[q
C,s
1 (b0; y1, y2) + y
s
1]
}
(A.70)
c0 = −b0
R
− q0 (A.71)
where ci,s1 , b
i,s
1 , q
i,s
1 are the solutions of the time 1 continuation equilibrium.
A.6.3 The Expectation Distortion under a Binomial State Space
Our goal is to assess the role of ambiguity attitudes on debt growth. To this purpose we shall
derive a closed form solution for policy functions. To do that we assume a simple binomial
structure for the state space. Hence we assume that the state space is comprised of two states,
which we label high, with sup-index h, occurring with probability pi, and low, with sup-index
l, occurring with probability (1 − pi). The exogenous state space therefore reads as follows
S = {h, l}. We assume that the in state h the income realization is high enough that the
collateral constraint is slack. Similarly we assume that in state l, the income realization is low
enough that the collateral constraint binds. Given this structure for the objective probability,
the expectation distortions are given by:
ms1 =
exp {σ0V s1 }
pi exp
{
σ0V h1
}
+ (1− pi) exp{σ0V l1} (A.72)
where the value function has the following form, V s1 = u(c
s
1) + βu(c
s
2). Given the assumptions
on the state space, it follows that:
V h1 > E0 {V s1 } and V l1 < E0 {V s1 } (A.73)
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Equation (A.72) and jointly imply that, if θ0 > 0, hence σ0 = − 1θ0 < 0, the following holds:
expσ0V
h
1 < E0 {expσ0V s1 |} ⇒ mh1 < 1 (A.74)
expσ0V
l
1 > E0 {expσ0V s1 } ⇒ ml1 > 1 (A.75)
Intuitively the above implies that agents assign an higher subjective probability (with respect
to the objective) to the bad history and a lower probability to the good history. We can call
this behaviour pessimism. Similarly if θ0 < 0, then σ0 = − 1θ0 > 0, we have that:
expσ0V h1 > E0 {expσ0V s1 } ⇒ mh1 > 1 (A.76)
expσ0V
l
1 < E0 {expσ0V s1 } ⇒ ml1 < 1 (A.77)
Note that in this second case agents assign an higher subjective probability to the good history
and a lower probability to the bad history, depicting borrowers’ optimistic behaviour. We
shall now solve the equilibrium and derive the implied debt policy functions under the above
beliefs’ structure. We start by characterizing the equilibrium at time zero, given by the optimal
decisions (b0, c0, q0). We also compare the two solutions to the case with rational expectations.
The debt policy function is best characterized by the following relation:
b0 = −R[c0 + q0] (A.78)
Next to characterize the time 0 policy function for consumption we rely on the Euler equation
between period 0 and period 1:
uc(c0) = pim
h
1uc(c
h
1) + (1− pi)ml1uc(cl1) (A.79)
We can reformulate the above equation in terms of the subjective weights of the ambiguity
averse agent:
uc(c0) = ψ
huc(c
h
1) + (1− pi)ψluc(cl1) (A.80)
where ψh = pimh1 and ψ
l = (1−pi)ml1. Given the model structure (incomplete financial markets,
hence lack of insurance to equalize consumption), the events structure and the condition on the
collateral constraint, we can conclude that:
ch1 > c
l
1 ⇒ uc(ch1) < uc(cl1) (A.81)
Next, recall that in the optimism case beliefs imply:
ψh = pimh1 > pi (A.82)
ψl = (1− pi)ml1 < (1− pi) (A.83)
This implies that agents assign a higher weight, with respect to the RE case, to the component
uc(c
h
1). Hence, the marginal utility of consumption in t = 0 is lower (than under rational
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expectations) and the consumption is higher:
co0 > c
RE
0 (A.84)
where co0 indicates consumption under optimism behaviour, while c
RE
0 indicates consumption
under no ambiguity. Intuitively agents assign higher weight to good future states, hence they
prefer to postpone consumption and to invest in the risky asset. This in turn will raise asset
price, since the demand of asset has increased. As investment takes place through leverage,
they will also leverage more. In the pessimism case the borrower assigns the following weights:
ψh = pimh1 < pi (A.85)
ψl = (1− pi)ml1 > (1− pi) (A.86)
This implies:
cu0 < c
RE
0 (A.87)
where cu0 indicates consumption under pessimistic behaviour. In this case the agent expects more
likely the bad state to take place in the future. The agent will then anticipate consumption and
invest less in the risky asset. They will in turn leverage less. We can generalize this relation
with the following condition:
co0 > c
RE
0 > c
u
0 (A.88)
A.7 Intermediation Channel
In this section we provide micro-foundations for a delegated monitoring problem in which the
collateral constraint emerges as resulting from an incentive-compatible debt contract enforced
through a bank. The micro-foundations follows Bianchi and Mendoza (2015). Debt contract
are signed by a bank that must enforce debtor incentives. Between periods borrowers can divert
revenues for an amount d˜ . At the end of the period the diversion is no longer possible and
payment is enforced. Banks can monitor financial diversion due to special relationship lending
abilities7. If the bank detects the diversion asset can be seized up to a percentage φ. As common
in dynamic economies we assume that the contract is done under no memory, so that in the next
periods borrowers can re-enter debt agreement even if they defaulted in the previous period.
This assumption allows us to preserve the Markov structure of the contracting/intermediation
problem.
We shall show that the collateral constraint can emerge as resulting from an incentive
compatibility constraint imposed by the bank through the debt design. Specifically the collateral
constraint can be derived as an implication of incentive-compatibility constraints on borrowers if
limited enforcement prevents banks from redeploying more than a fraction φ of the value of the
assets owned by a defaulting borrower. Define V R and V D respectively the value of repayment
7We assume zero monitoring costs for simplicity. Extending it to the case with positive monitoring costs is
rather straightforward.
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and default and define as V the continuation value.
If the borrower defaults the diverted resources enter his budget constraint and the recursive
problem reads as follows (for notational convenience we skip the beliefs constraints for the
purpose of this derivation):
V D(b, x, S) = max
c,x′,b′
{u(c) + βES+ (A.89)
+ λ
[
y + q(S)(x+ αy) + d˜+ b− q(S)x′ − c− b
′
R
]
+
+ µ
[
φq(S)x′ +
b′
R
]
On the other side if the borrower repays his value function reads as:
V D(b, x, S) = max
c,x′,b′
{u(c) + βES+ (A.90)
+ λ
[
y + q(S)(x+ αy) + b− q(S)x′ − c− b
′
R
]
+
+ µ
[
φq(S)x′ +
b′
R
]
The comparison of the two easily shows that the households repay if and only if d˜′ < φq(S)x′.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 MS-VAR Data
Countries: Italy, Spain, Portugal
• Private Interest rate: Lending rate to non-financial corporations -over 5years maturity.
Source: SDW European Central Bank. Database: MFI Interest Rate Statistics. Webpage:
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu
• Sovereign Interest rate: Long-term (10 years maturity) government bonds interest rates.
Source: OECD. Database: Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics (MEI). Webpage:
http://stats.oecd.org
• Risk-free Interest rate: Yields on zero-coupon German government securities with a resid-
ual maturity of 6 months (Nelson-Siegel-Svensson method). Source: Deutsche Bun-
desbank. Webpage: https://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_
series_databases/time_series_databases.html
• Government Debt-to-GDP : General Government Maastricht debt. Source: SDW Eu-
ropean Central Bank. Database: Government Finance Statistics. Webpage: http:
//sdw.ecb.europa.eu
• HICP Country weights: Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices weights for the euro area.
Source: Eurostat. Webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
B.2 MS-VAR Estimation
For the empirical section on MS-BVAR estimation we closely follow Sims, Waggoner and Zha
(2008). A detailed description of the Bayesian inference is reported below.
B.2.1 The posterior
The notation: θ are the model’s parameters; while q = (qi,j) ∈ Rh2 are the regimes’ transi-
tion probabilities; Yt = (y1, .., yt) ∈ (Rn)t are observed data, with n denoting the number of
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endogenous variables; St = (s0, .., st) ∈ Ht+1 is the latent process, with H ∈ 1, .., h.
The log-likelihood, p(YT |θ, q), is combined with the prior density, p(θ, q) to obtain the pos-
terior density, p(θ, q|YT ) = p(θ, q)p(YT |θ, q).
The likelihood
Following Hamilton (1994), Sims and Zha (2006), ans Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008), we
employ a class of Markov-switching VAR with the following compact form:
y
′
tA0(st) = x
′
tF (st) + 
′
tΣ
−1(st)
with x
′
t = [y
′
t−1 ... y
′
t−ρ 1] and F (st) = [A1(st) ... Aρ(st) C(st)]′. Let aj(k) be the jth column of
A0(k), fj(k) be the jth column of F (k) and ξj(k) be the jth diagonal element of Σ(k). The
conditional likelihood is as follows:
p(yt|st, Yt−1) = |A0(st)|
n∏
j=1
|ξj(st)|exp
(
−ξ
2(st)
2
(y
′
taj(st)− x
′
tfj(st))
2
)
Formalizing the model’s identifying restrictions in the following form: aj(st) = Ujbj(k) and
fj(st) = Vjgj −WjUjbj(k), where Uj and Vj are matrices with orthonormal columns, we re-
write it in terms of the free parameters of A(st) and F (st). Then,
|A0(st)|
n∏
j=1
|ξj(st)|exp
(
−ξ
2(st)
2
((y
′
t + x
′
tWj)Ujbj(st)− x
′
tVjgj(st))
2
)
The log-likelihood function is given by:
p(YT |θ, q) =
T∑
t
ln
{
h∑
st=1
p(yt|st, Yt−1)Pr[st|Yt−1]
}
The overall likelihood function is computed using the modified Kalman filter described in Kim
and Nelson (1999). It is, therefore, obtained by integrating over unobserved states the con-
ditional likelihood at each time t and by recursively multiplying these conditional likelihood
functions forward.
The prior
Following Sims and Zha (1998), we exploit the idea of a Litterman’s random-walk prior on the
BVAR coefficients. Dummy observations are introduced as a component of the prior in order
to allow for unit roots and co-integration relationships. Priors are assumed to be symmetric
across regimes. Applying the model’s identifying restrictions, the overall prior, p(θ, q) is given
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by:
p(bj(k)) = N(bj(k)|0,Σbj )
p(gj(k)) = N(gj(k)|0,Σgj )
p(ξ2j (k)) = G(ξ
2
j (k)|α¯j , β¯j)
p(qj) = D(qi,j |αi,j , αk,j)
where k is the generic regime and Σbj , Σgj denote the prior covariance matrices for the
BVAR coefficients. The hyperparameters controlling the tightness of the prior are set to the
standard values for monthly data, as suggested by Sims and Zha (2006): µ1 = 0.57, µ2 = 0.13,
µ3 = 0.1, µ4 = 1.2, µ5 = 10, µ6 = 10. A Gamma prior is, instead, applied on the structural
shocks’ variances, with α¯j and β¯j both set to 1. Finally, the prior of the transition matrix takes
a Dirichlet form, as suggested by ?, with αi,j = 1 and αk,j = 5.7. The latter implies a prior
belief that the average duration of staying in the same regime is 21 months.
B.2.2 MCMC simulation: Gibbs Sampling
Following Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008), a MCMC simulation method is used to approximate
the joint posterior density, p(θ, q, ST |YT ). When working with models whose posterior distribu-
tion is very complicated in shape it is very important to initialize the MCMC simulation at the
peak of the posterior density. The latter is obtained with the blockwise optimization algorithm
(BFGS algorithm conditional on blocks) developed by Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008).
We follow them and use the Gibbs sampler to obtain the joint posterior distribution. The
Gibbs sampler involves sampling alternatively from the following conditional posterior distribu-
tions: p(ST |YT , θ, q), p(q|YT , ST , θ) and p(θ|YT , q, ST ). The simulation performs 500,000 draws,
with a 10% burn-in sample.
Conditional posterior density: p(θ|YT , q, ST ): In order to simulate draws of θ ∈ {bj(k), gj(k), ξ2j (k)}
from p(θ|YT , q, ST ), we start by using the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm to sample from:
p(bj(k)|yt, St, bt(k)) =
exp
(
−1
2
b
′
j(k)Σ
−1
bj
bj(k)
)
x
∏
j
[
|A0(k)|exp
(
−ξ
2(st)
2
(y
′
taj(k)− x
′
tfj(k))
2
)]
Then, a multivariate Normal distribution is employed to draw gj(k):
p(gj(k)|yt, St) = N(gj(k)| ¯µgj(k), ¯Σgj(k))
Finally, shocks’ variances ξ2j are simulated from a gamma distribution:
p(ξ2j (k)|yt, St) = G(ξ2j (k)| ¯αj(k), ¯βj(k))
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Conditional posterior density: p(ST |YT , θ, q): A multi-move Gibbs-sampling is employed to
simulate St, t = 1, 2...T . First, we draw st according to:
p(st|yt, St) =
∑
st+1∈H
p(st|YT , θ, q, st+1)p(st+1|YT , θ, q)
where
p(st|YT , θ, q, st+1) =
qst+1,stp(st+1|Yt,θ,q)
p(st+1|Yt, θ, q)
Then, in order to generate st, a uniform distribution is used: if the generated number is less
than or equal to the calculated value of p(st|yt, St), we set st = 1; otherwise st = 0.
Conditional posterior density: p(q|YT , ST , θ): The conditional posterior distribution of qj is:
p(qj |Yt, St) =
h∏
i=1
(qi,j)
ni,j+βi,j−1
where ni,j is the number of transitions from st−1 to st = i.
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B.3 MS-VAR. Some results
Table B.1: Relative structural shocks’ standard deviations, by regime (ξvol)−1)
Regimes(ξvolt = 1, 0) Private Spread Sovereign Spread Debt-to-GDP
High Volatility (Hvol) 1 1 1
Low Volatility (Lvol) 0.37925 0.38502 1.00940
Table B.2: Transition matrix
Volatility Regimes Vulnerability Regimes Synchronization Regimes
Regimes High Low High Low High Low
High 0.78418 0.019721
Low 0.21582 0.98028
High 0.89567 0.05312
Low 0.10433 0.94688
High 0.94204 0.02341
Low 0.057962 0.97659
Duration 4.6335 50.7099 9.5850 18.8253 17.2533 42.7168
Table B.3: Conditional moments, by regime
Conditional means Share
Regimes Private Spread Sovereign Spread Debt-to-GDP %
H volatility 3.685 5.221 95.492 4.487
L volatility 2.484 2.772 97.67 95.513
H vulnerability 3.296 4.689 104.62 29.487
L vulnerability 2.221 2.125 94.765 70.513
H synchronization 2.623 2.897 88.146 27.564
L synchronization 2.506 2.876 101.42 72.436
Sample 2.5008 2.822 96.261 100
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Set of Model Conditions
The model is characterized by the following set of equation. Variables defined with the symbol
Xˆt are detrended variables (normalized for the level of aggregate TFP).
1 = βEt
{
edt+1−dt
cˆt − Φcˆt−1e−(γ+at)
cˆt+1 − Φcˆte−(γ+at+1)
e−(γ+at+1)
Rmt+1
Πt+1
}
(C.1)
Rmt =
1 + ρPmt
Pmt−1
, Rt = Et[Rmt+1] (C.2)
ϕt =
[
cˆt − Φcˆt−1e−(γ+at)
] hαt
1− α (C.3)
yˆt = h
1−α
t (C.4)
1
νt
(
1− ϕt(1− α)
)
= 1− ψ
(
Πt −
Πιt−1
Πι−1
)
Πt − ψ
2
(
Πt −
Πιt−1
Πι−1
)2 νt − 1
νt
(C.5)
+βEt
{
cˆt − Φcˆt−1e−(γ+at)
cˆt+1 − Φcˆte−(γ+at+1)
ψ
(
Πt+1 − Π
ι
t
Πι−1
)
Πt+1
yˆt+1
yˆt
}
(C.6)
κ
1 + ιβ
log
(
1− ν
1− νt
)
= µt (C.7)
bt = bt−1
Rmt
Πt
yˆt−1
yˆt
e−(γ+at) − τt + et (C.8)
χt
χ
=
(
χt−1
χ
)ρχ( yˆt
yˆnt
)ιy(1−ρχ)
eσχε
χ
t (C.9)
χt =
(
1− 1
gt
)
e−1t (C.10)
et = e
S
t + e
L
t (C.11)
eLt = ρeLe
L
t−1 + σeLε
eL
t (C.12)
eSt = ρeSe
S
t−1 + (1− ρeS )
[
eS + φy
(
yˆt − yˆnt
)]
+ σeSε
eS
t (C.13)
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τt = ρττt−1 + (1− ρτ )
[
τ + δb(bt−1 − b) + δe(et − e) + δy
(
yˆt − yˆnt
)]
+ στε
τ
t (C.14)
gt ≡ 1
1− Gˆtyˆt
; 1 =
cˆt
yˆt
+
gt − 1
gt
(C.15)
yˆnt =
[
1− νt
yˆnt
gt
− Φ yˆ
n
t−1
gt−1 e
−(γ+at)
] 1−α
α
(C.16)
C.2 Steady State System
The steady state of the model is characterized by the following set of equations:
Rm =
Π
β
eγ (C.17)
Pm =
1
Rm − ρ (C.18)
R = Rm (C.19)
ϕ =
1− ν
1− α (C.20)
e =
(
1− 1
β
)
b∗ + τ∗ (C.21)
eS = e (C.22)
χ =
(
1− 1
g∗
)
e−1 (C.23)
h = ϕ(1− α) g
∗
1− Φe−γ (C.24)
y = h1−α (C.25)
c =
y
g∗
(C.26)
yn = y (C.27)
C.3 Solution Methods
The Markov-switching DSGE model is solved using the perturbation method of Foerster et al.
(2016). They develop an iterative procedure that approximate the model’s solution by guessing
a set of approximations under each regime; given a guess, each regime’s approximation follows
from standard perturbation techniques, and the iterative algorithm stops when obtained ap-
proximations equal the guesses. This perturbation approach has two major advantages. First,
it provides a flexible environment for models, like ours, in which switching dynamics affect the
steady state of the economy. This is a feature that perturbation handles easily. In addition,
perturbation allows for second and higher-order approximations, which improve, on one hand,
the solution accuracy and, on the other hand, the ability to capture the role of agents’ beliefs
over regimes.
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In order to technically describe the solution method, it’s convenient to stack our variables
into a group of exogenous and endogenous predetermined variables, xt ∈ Rnx , and a group
of non-predetermined (control) variables, yt ∈ Rny . Then, we define the vector of structural
shocks as t ∈ Rn and the switching parameters’ vector as θ(ξspt ) ∈ Rnθ . Given the vector
of state variables (xt−1, t, ξ
sp
t ), the equilibrium conditions for our model have the following
general form:
Etf
(
yt+1,yt,xt,xt−1, χt+1, t, θ(ξ
sp
t+1, χ), θ(ξ
sp
t , χ)
)
= 0ny+ny
where f is a nonlinear function. Then, the algorithm works as an extension of conventional
perturbation methods (?, ?), where not only t+1 is perturbed, but also the switching param-
eters, θ(ξspt+1), θ(ξ
sp
t ). Since in our model the steady state is affected by the policy regime in
place, the perturbation function for θ(ξspt ) is: θ(k, χ) = χθ(k) + (1 − χ)θ¯, where χ ∈ R is the
perturbation parameter, k indicates a generic regime and θ¯ = [θ(1)...θ(ns)]p¯ is the ergodic mean
of θ(ξspt ).
Stacking the regime-dependent solutions for yt and xt, the algorithm assumes the following
functional forms for Yt = yt(e
T
st ⊗ Iny)−1 and Xt = xt(eTst ⊗ Inx)−1:
Yt = G(xt−1, t, χ) =
 gξspt =1(xt−1,t,χ)...
g
ξ
sp
t =ns
(xt−1,t,χ)

Xt = H(xt−1, t, χ) =
 hξspt =1(xt−1,t,χ)...
h
ξ
sp
t =ns
(xt−1,t,χ)

where gξspt : R
nx+n+1 → Rny and hξspt : Rnx+n+1 → Rnx are continuously differentiable regime-
dependent solutions. Second-order perturbation around the point (xss,0ss, 0) is represented by:
G(zt) ≈ Yss +DG(zss)(zt − zss) + 1
2
nz∑
l1
nz∑
l2
Dl2Dl1G(zss)(zt,l1 − zss,l1)(zt,l2 − zss,l2)
H(zt) ≈ Xss +DH(zss)(zt − zss) + 1
2
nz∑
l1
nz∑
l2
Dl2Dl1H(zss)(zt,l1 − zss,l1)(zt,l2 − zss,l2)
where zt = [xt−1, t, χ], zss = [xss, 0n , 0], and zt,l and zss,l are the lth components of zt and
zss.
C.4 Observation Equations
The model’s law of motion for the variables St is combined with the following system of obser-
vation equations:
Xt = D + ZST (C.28)
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where Xt = [∆log(Y
obs
t ), Π
obs
t , R
obs
t , b
obs
t , log(g
obs
t ), t
obs
t , e
obs
t ]
′
containes the observables, D
the vector of constants and Zt provides the mapping between the model’s solution and the data.
The system of equations reads as follows:
∆log(Y obst ) = γ + at + yt − yt−1
Πobst = log
Pt
Pt−1
= log(Π) + Πt
Robst = 4
(
(Π− 1) + γ
β
− 1
)
+ 4rt
bobst = b+ bt
log(gobst ) = log(g) + gt
tobst = t+ tt
eobst = e+ et
where the percentage deviation of the detrended output from its steady state is yt = log
(
Y obst
At
Y
A
)
and the percentage deviations for inflation, government purchases and interest rates are Πt =
log
(
Πobst
Π
)
, gt = log
(
gobst
g
)
with gobst =
1
1−Gobst /Y obst
, and Rt = log
(
Robst
R
)
. For the variables
normalized with respect to GDP the linear deviations are bt = b
obs
t − b, tt = tobst − t and
et = e
obs
t − e.
C.5 Data
Country: France
• Y obst : Real GDP. Source: INSEE. Database: National accounts. Webpage: https://
insee.fr/en/information/2868584#titre-bloc-1
• Πobst : GDP deflator inflation. Source: INSEE. Database: National accounts.
• Robst : short-term nominal interest rate. Source: OECD. Database: Main Economic Indi-
cators. Webpage: http://stats.oecd.org
• bobst : Gov. debt-to-GDP ratio, Maastricht debt. Source: INSEE, IMF Historical Public
Debt Database. Webpage: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/
12/31/A-Historical-Public-Debt-Database-24332
• Gobst : Government purchases=consumption expenditure+gross government investment+net
purchases of non-produced assets-consumption of fixed capital. Source: INSEE. Database:
National accounts.
• tobst : Tax revenues-to-GDP ratio, where Taxes=current receipts-current tranfer receipts.
Source: INSEE. Database: National accounts.
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• eobst : Government Expenditure-to-GDP, where Gov. Expenditure=Gov.Purchases+Transfers,
and Transfers=net current transfer payments+subsidies+net capital transfers. Source:
INSEE. Database: National accounts.
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C.6 MCMC Simulation: Posterior densities
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